SDG 17

RATIONALE, UNDERSTANDING, AREAS OF FOCUS
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For 18 months now, humanity has been weighing up the value of essential and non-essential activities. At least this is the case in countries with a decent average income, while others are experiencing a deadly reduction of essential activities. The health crisis also forces us to reflect on the causes and consequences of this once-in-a-century challenge that we are collectively experiencing.

In the foreword to the report of the 2020 session of the High-Level Political Forum¹, Antonio Guterres acknowledges that “some gains were visible” prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, but that “change was still not happening at the speed or scale required”. He also notes that “due to COVID-19, an unprecedented health, economic and social crisis is threatening lives and livelihoods, making the achievement of Goals even more challenging”. However, most interestingly, he highlights the fact that “it is vital to understand that the pandemic is powerfully revealing the need to strengthen the sustainability of our models”.

In effect, suddenly, the messages broadcast for more than 50 years – the first Stockholm report dates from 1972 – on the intersections and interdependences between economic, environmental and social factors (the 3 pillars of sustainable development) are dramatically coming to life. Contrary to simplistic analyses that, in this period of an unprecedented once-in-a-century health crisis, would like to relegate sustainable development to a non-priority activity, the Covid-19 crisis precisely highlights the strong intersections between all of the sustainable development fields: the destruction of our environment can have direct and tragic global consequences such as the development of a new virus, that is tanking our economy and inducing, at the end of the chain, social and life-impacting consequences that are sometimes very serious.

The main challenges that have to be tackled in order to increase the sustainability of our actions are perfectly summed up in the 2030 Agenda and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It serves as both a political framework and a tool for steering our public policies and strategies. It highlights the constant intersections and marked interdependencies between each of the 17 goals to be achieved over the next 10 years.

The last SDG, SDG 17, was designed upon the initiative of developing countries so that the statement “leave no one behind” is embodied by specific actions, not just vague commitments. This goal is an act of trust regarding the capacity of the world to surmount the 21st century crises by forming partnerships between all actors, from the most powerful state to the humblest citizen. If it is betrayed, we will be thrust into dangerous instability, and worse.

SDG 17 is more than a culmination of the other 16 goals: under its title “Strengthen global partnership for sustainable development”, it enumerates and revitalises international cooperation and enriches civil society multilateralism.

We have chosen to demonstrate the extent to which its 19 targets are all essential key requirements that can be translated into practical projects on

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¹ The High-Level Political Forum is a United Nations conference. Each year in July, the UN invites governments and civil society organisations to report on their efforts to further the SDGs in their respective countries.
the ground (part 1), and also how it conveys a new public philosophy based on building the common good (part 2). Symbolically, we too have founded an editorial partnership to demonstrate this point.

Clearly, in the midst of a health crisis, questions surround the future of this SDG, which follows on the heels of SDG 16, a goal that sets conditions for its advent by promising a “peaceful and inclusive” society. The shock of the 2008 financial crisis compromised the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), yet this crisis is more serious, more widespread and… more human. It will compromise the 2030 Agenda, unless this collective shock makes us rethink our priorities and our model; unless we choose Being before Having.

So, even though the pandemic is lasting too long and financial hubris, instead of solidarity, is still dramatically illustrated in shocking inequalities in terms of vaccine access, we can still see positive signs; the American president is bringing the United States back to the fold in the fight against climate change. He supports and is increasing OECD efforts for a global corporate tax that will reduce the very high levels of public debt, and the relaunch plans are even “greener” than after the 2008 crisis.

But most of all, this crisis demonstrates the usefulness of partnerships between all actors: NGOs and governments, businesses and local authorities, in order to treat, feed, vaccinate, protect… and live. The UN is able to confirm, in its 2020 SDG progress report⁴ that “containing COVID-19 requires the participation of all Governments, the private sector, civil society organisations and ordinary citizens around the world. Strengthening multilateralism and global partnership are more important than ever”. Moreover, it relates to one of the objectives of the draft programming law regarding joint development and the fight against global inequalities, which proposes to “reformulate the development policy on a partnership model and a shared responsibility with partnering countries”⁵.

We are tempted to propose a twentieth target for SDG 17: “create partnerships in times of major crisis”.

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3. Project preamble.
Adopted in September 2015 by all countries around the world, the 2030 Agenda not only sets out a programme, a political framework for the world for the period 2015-2030, but is also a very specific, practical tool for steering the transformation strategies of public and private organisations and territories.

**Firstly, a shared vision:** let’s not underestimate the historical and political reach of the adoption of this Agenda for the world. It is the first time in a long time that all countries around the world are in agreement on a joint programme, a vision of how our planet should look from now until 2030. A world where essential services will be ensured for everyone, everywhere; where the economy will become a responsible one that benefits human development; where social, geographical, age and gender equality will be respected; where the protection of the environment, the climate and biodiversity will be achieved; and where peace, justice and cooperation will reign within and between all countries. Such was the shared vision of governments and political regimes as varied as Hungary, Vietnam, Sudan, Chile, the United Kingdom, Canada, China, Morocco, Venezuela, and even France! 2015, successful momentum for multilateralism!

**Secondly, a practical instrument for steering the sustainable transformation of the development models of our organisations and territories:** The 2030 Agenda is composed of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), each of them representing a thematic, sectoral or cross-cutting challenge to be tackled: the fight against poverty, access to healthcare, to water, development of sustainable agriculture, economic growth, innovation, development of infrastructures, the fight against inequalities and climate change, preservation and restoration of biodiversity etc. Devised as ways of guiding the sustainable transformation of our countries, territories and organisations, these 17 SDGs were set out with several targets (or sub-goals) to be achieved for each of them. In turn, the targets are allocated indicators to encourage countries around the world to measure the progress of their transformation. In a nutshell, it is a very practical steering instrument!

This joint programme, this practical instrument, first and foremost encourages the breakdown of divisions and the strengthening of cooperation between all the actors. A direct successor to two existing points of reference (Agenda 21 and the Millennium Development Goals – MDGs), the 2030 Agenda proposes a joint framework and therefore “reconnects” the world of international development, solidarity and cooperation with that of sustainable development and protecting the planet. Beyond this, the 2030 Agenda also targets every state (regardless of their stage of development), along with companies, associations and local and regional authorities. It also represents a powerful tool for initiating multi-actor cooperation.

**The issue of cooperation, both international and multi-actor, is the very essence of the 17th and last SDG on the 2030 Agenda.** The most political of all the SDGs and truly separate, it is the one that raises the question of the resources that we allocate to successfully achieve the other 16 sectoral or thematic SDGs. Moreover, this is the reason why it is the only one to be reviewed each year at the High-Level Political Forum, because no resources mean no results.

With this in mind, many actors claim to be implementing SDG 17, but sometimes without truly studying the content of its 19 targets (it is the SDG with the most targets) or often by summing it up solely based on target 17 relating to multi-actor partnerships while bypassing the other 18 targets of this crucial SDG. This is why we feel it is important to use this memorandum to carry out the explanatory work that is required to:

- explain the challenges of the 19 targets of SDG 17, illustrating them with concrete examples and projects completed by governments, businesses, local authorities or associations (part 1);
- share our understanding of the entire strategic/ideological scope of SDG 17 and what it says about our world, which is currently experiencing multiple crises (environmental, health, economic and social) that are juxtaposed and multiplying (part 2).

Led by Le Comité 21, with the participation of Le Rameau, Cités Unies France, Convergences, La Fonda, CIRRMA (Inter-regional Conference of Regional Multi-Stakeholder Networks), and with the support of UNDP and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this memorandum aims to reflect the spirit of cooperation of SDG 17. It is the result of the months-long collaboration between these French civil society organisations. Here they present their vision and understanding of this cross-cutting SDG and propose routes to accelerating its implementation in the field.

4. See page 67 for the presentation of all of the co-authors and partners of this memorandum.
THE 19 TARGETS:
UNDERSTANDING, EXPLANATION & INTERPRETATION

This first part is a teaching exercise to explain the 19 targets (or sub-goals) of SDG 17.

Each target is detailed over 2 or 3 pages, with a presentation of its context, challenges and importance for increasing the sustainability of our world. There are also illustrations allocated to each target with 2, 3 or 4 examples of projects or models implemented by an actor or a group of actors (governments, businesses, local authorities or associations). This is in order to make the targets more concrete and to convince all public and private organisations that they too can become SDG 17 implementation actors, and at their own pace: via public-private partnerships, decentralised cooperation, innovative regional alliance, or even by taking part in state or interstate schemes.

The aim is to explain the targets to the widest possible audience, without seeking to be exhaustive or with the rigorousness that would be required by a scientific research project. This work is intended to explain and concretise the 19 targets carried out by French civil society organisations, who share their understanding and interpretation of each of the 19 challenges raised by the SDG 17.
The indispensable mobilisation of fiscal resources:

It is often said that it is taxpayers who build their country. This mobilisation requires better tax collection, the creation of new tax revenues adapted to countries, the implementation of more transparent and effective customs and taxation systems, increased support for national investment and attracting direct investment from abroad, the strengthening of public and private institutional capacities, and the optimisation of cooperation resources. Since the turn of the millennium, progress has been made in numerous developing countries. However, significant challenges remain, notably amongst the least advanced, mainly due to weak fiscal resources (only 13% of their GDP on average), embezzlement of funds, fraud and frequent corruption.

The SDG 17 target also encourages official development assistance (ODA) and the inclusion of the aforementioned points in bilateral agreements between developed countries and developing ones. This is why the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of 2015, within the SDG framework, sets out three commitments:

- Participating international aid donors collectively committed to doubling their technical cooperation in the area of tax/mobilisation of national resources by 2020;
- Partner countries reaffirmed their commitment to intensifying the mobilisation of national resources as a key instrument to be implemented, in order to achieve the SDGs and attain inclusive development;
- All the countries reaffirmed their commitment to guaranteeing political unity for development.

Cooperate to mobilise

In this way, programmes are drawn up to enhance the institutional capacities of the least developed countries, arm them with efficient monitoring methods, and strengthen the transparency and accountability of all actors, including aid beneficiaries. The European Union has defined its strategy in this field, under the framework of the European Consensus “Collect more, spend better” that applies to the 11th European Development Fund. For its part, in 2020 France set out its inter-ministerial strategy for “support for better mobilisation of internal resources in developing economies”. Local authorities that are actively involved in international solidarity and development aid, notably thanks to the principle of decentralised cooperation, integrate these strategic orientations into their projects; as does official development assistance (for example, through AFD, the French Development Agency) and French foreign direct investments (FDI) in developing countries (more than 7 billion euro in 2017).
The Covid-19 crisis, which has caused a sharp downturn in income for tax authorities, is creating a dangerous pause in the development of poor countries. The G20 came to their assistance in April 2020, with a new extension to the moratorium on the debt of the poorest countries, and by authorising a new issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) amounting to $650 billion.

La Fondation de Lille: The First Community Foundation Created in France

(created: local authorities, companies, citizens)

Created in 1997, La Fondation de Lille was the first community foundation created in France. It works in a variety of fields of general interest (vulnerable, education, culture, environment, humanitarian etc.) to help its community. It helps to build collective engagement, and pools resources (financial, with tax relief on donations from individuals and organisations, payment-in-kind work and volunteer skill sharing), in favour of the beneficiaries and local associations. It currently has 4 foundations, governed by different by-laws (company, association, linked to a geographical department, public-private partnership), which are respectively la Fondation Toyota Valenciennes, la Fondation Renaissance du Lille ancien, la Fondation de la Manche and the association AMIS (Multi-level Support for Healthcare Initiatives) between the region of Lille and Saint-Louis in Sénégal. The AMIS association encourages twinning between hospitals, knowledge-sharing and contributes towards Sénégal’s healthcare policy. In partnership with La Fondation de Lille, medical institutes in Lille and Dakar, the AMIS association plans to build a cochlear implant centre in Sénégal to treat people who suffer from incapacitating hearing loss.

As part of its humanitarian activities, La Foundation de Lille has supported 76 NGO projects in 41 intervention zones, primarily located in southern countries. It mobilises funds of more than 2.4 million euro, has the capacity to provide skills such as firefighters, and delivers materials in fields such as nutrition, healthcare, education, and building refurbishment (housing, schools etc.).

http://www.fondationdelille.org

The Marshall Plan for Bogota

(created: local authorities, companies, citizens)

Bogota’s local authority approved the draft 315 agreement in 2020, for “economic recovery and to formally register companies in the capital’s district”, which allows for tax relief for individuals and companies who have been affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. The key measures of the Marshall Plan for the Colombian capital are the freezing of land tax in 2021 for 2.6 million proprietors, tax relief granted to companies that have been the most affected by the pandemic, and exemption from land tax for schools and nurseries. The project aims to encourage those who have experienced the highest growth in their income to contribute towards balancing Bogota’s budget.


Decentralised Cooperation Between the Department of Seine-Maritime and the Communes of Bam in Burkina Supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(created: local authorities, companies, citizens)

This cooperation project was born when decentralisation in Burkina Faso required the collection of local tax resources. The difficulty is that the collection area is vast and certain zones are sometimes hard to reach. Decentralised cooperation with the Seine-Maritime department made it possible to train local elected officials and officers, identify sources and organise tax collection with a view to implementing a sustainable strategy for collecting, mobilising and exploiting local financial resources. In this way, the collaboration has helped to increase budget resources while simultaneously improving the lives of local people.

https://www.seinemaritime.fr/docs/Carnetfiches Best-of HD(1).pdf
Feedback on ODA

Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as “government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries”. ODA can be made up of donations (subsidies) or concessional loans (with more favourable rates than the market rate).

ODA is not solely supplied by national governments but may also come from local authorities, or bodies acting on behalf of public bodies. Thus, actions by local authorities strengthen the effects of national ODA.

In 2019, ODA provided by French local authorities amounted to 121.9 million euro (out of a global ODA of 10.877 billion euro), representing a 5% increase on the previous year. More than 50% of this aid in France is dedicated to assisting refugees and asylum seekers from ODA countries. On a global level, France is the fifth-largest global contributor of ODA in terms of volume, and the ninth-largest as a percentage of GDP allocated to this assistance (0.44% of French gross domestic product (GDP) was allocated to ODA in 2019). At the December 2020 humanitarian conference, the French President confirmed commitments undertaken to increase French official development assistance (ODA) to a level of 0.55% of GDP in 2022, of which 500 million euro would be earmarked for humanitarian causes.

A target of 0.7%... in 50 years’ time

The target of dedicating 0.7% of gross domestic product to assisting developing countries was not set in the 2030 Agenda, even though the Sustainable Development Goals and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda to finance sustainable development adopted in July 2015 offered a renewed framework, adapted to implementing more virtuous objectives by all and for all.

In fact, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution in 1970 stating that each economically advanced country should progressively increase its official development assistance to
reach 0.7% of its GDP during the following decade. This figure, calculated by Jan Tinbergen, a Nobel peace prize winner, represented a level of aid that allows beneficiary countries to achieve sustainable development.

The majority of OECD member countries adopted the target without implementing it and regularly reaffirm it during each international conference. On average, OECD member countries collectively only allocate 0.3% of their gross domestic product towards ODA, which is far from the target set by the UN. In 2019, only five states adhered to or even surpassed this target: Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

ODA must aim for sustainable development

The purpose of this aid is to put a stop to growing inequalities between countries and populations and eventually contribute to reducing them. The financial difficulties of developing countries and the least developed countries force them to make choices in terms of investments, while living conditions can already be difficult. As they cannot act on all fronts, it seems that their capacity for action on the 17 global goals is limited. Therefore, it is the duty of the industrialised nations to provide them with financial assistance, as set out in this target, to enable economic development and to improve living conditions in these countries. Decent standards of living can allow a population to work towards increased sustainability. Also, via official development assistance, the wealthiest nations provide the means for less developed nations to work

alongside them to successfully achieve the aims of the 2030 Agenda.

Official development assistance allows for financing more virtuous areas of action and solutions, thus becoming an essential lever of sustainable development. It illustrates and concretises the responsibility of the wealthiest countries to promote and allow a different growth model, by encouraging, for example, renewable energy or family farms.

ODA COUNTRY, BY THE DEPARTMENT OF VAL-DE-MARNE

Official development assistance allows for financing more virtuous areas of action and solutions, thus becoming an essential lever of sustainable development. It illustrates and concretises the responsibility of the wealthiest countries to promote and allow a different growth model, by encouraging, for example, renewable energy or family farms.

The rural commune of Sakoïba was chosen for this decentralised cooperation in 2010, thus integrating the Arnage twinning Committee since this time. Five areas for priority action were defined via a decentralised cooperation charter between the two towns: support for education, healthcare, access to drinking water, to economic life, and cultural exchanges. Since then, the twinning Committee volunteers have formed an association and became the Arnage Mali Group in 2020.

A concrete example of an action implemented: Thanks to partnership with the association FORAGES MALI, based in Alençon, 17 Malian villages were equipped with new drinking water fountains between 2017 and 2020. Since their installation, improvements in health have been observed, and now that women are no longer required to fetch water in pots, girls can go to school and their mothers are free to work in the fields.

Support to draw up a sanitation master plan in Yên Bái in Vietnam

The project partners are supporting the Yên Bái provincial People’s Committee to create a sanitation master plan for the town of Yên Bái so that the province can take stock of its existing systems and draw up an action plan for the collection and treatment of wastewater by 2030, taking into account environmental factors. Actions will be prioritised and budgeted. Thanks to this document, the People’s Committee will be able to seek funders to finance the actions. Support is provided throughout the key project stages (project management support, drawing up specifications, technical consultancy monitoring, validation of phases, etc.) and completed by discussions on specific themes to enable the People’s Committee to adopt the methodology of the sanitation master plan and apply it to other zones in the province. The project, with a total cost of €280,086, has been supported by MEAE (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) at a cost of €41,000 per year over 3 years.
Institutional ODA is not enough

The financial resources mentioned here must be on several levels: an increase in official development assistance (complementary to target 2), an increase in private investments geared towards developing countries (complementary to target 5), and innovative additional financing.

This range of financing is in line with the indicator chosen by the UN to measure this target (17.3.1 – foreign direct investments, official development assistance and South-South cooperation as a proportion of total domestic budget) and 17.3.2 – volume of remittances (in US dollars) as a proportion of total GDP.

A crucial supplement

Taking into account the fact that the wealthiest countries are not hitting the development assistance targets set more than 50 years ago, and that private investors are not enough to remedy inadequate contributions from governments and international bodies (see sheet N°5, only 6% of private finance mobilised in favour of financing development benefited LDCs between 2012 and 2018), it is clear that new supplementary financial resources still need to be developed given the major challenges (notably sustainable development) that developing countries are facing. Chronically under-financed, LDCs thus represent the “ultimate test” for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); it is therefore crucial to support their efforts with “adequate” and supplementary financial resources.

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Two examples of supplementary resources applied to sustainable development

1. Climate

The central battle of sustainable development is the fight against climate change. However, financial efforts in this area fall short of expectations when it comes to helping LDCs to face these challenges. Chronic underinvestment can be observed in adaptation compared to the mitigation of the effects of climate change: less than 10% of climate-based financial aid is allocated to poor countries. In reality, the wealthiest countries and international institutions have only provided one fifth of the amount promised from now until the end of 2020, according to a study by the NGO Care. The United Nations has estimated that 300 billion dollars from now until 2030, then up to 500 billion from now until 2050 will be needed to deal with the costs linked to climate change. The organisation underlines the lack of new, “concrete and ambitious” financial engagement to help the most vulnerable countries to adapt and estimates that “the absence of new financial contributions casts more than one doubt over the true engagement of States and financial institutions”.

On 25 January 2021, the first world summit entirely dedicated to adapting to climate change and the question of financing it took place. 50 heads of state and government undertook to increase their financial participation towards action to adapt to climate change, in order to split efforts 50/50 between mitigating climate change and adapting to it. According to the AFD, France has, for its part, “already increased its support four-fold for adaptation since 2016”, and “will re-increase the level of its climate financing to more than six billion euro per year, of which one third of this will be allocated to adaptation”, representing approximately two billion euro. This provides supplementary financing under the ODA framework. Regarding the climate, the main financial resource to make use of is the Green Climate Fund. This UN financial mechanism, attached to UNFCCC, but legally independent, is led by a Board composed of 24 members, with an equal number of developed and developing countries. Envisaged in 2009 in Copenhagen as “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding”, it has been operational since 2015 and its purpose is to invest in developing countries, particularly the Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States and African States, to support their climate change adaptation efforts. Encouraging progress has been observed in the domain of financing. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has allocated 40% of its total portfolio to adaptation and is attracting more and more private sector investment.

2. The fight against the pandemic

The Covid-19 crisis has added new urgency to ones already identified. Several measures have been implemented or studied to tackle the health crisis and economic consequences of the pandemic on the most vulnerable countries. Certain donor countries have already announced a reallocation of ODA to support basic living standards, to urgently build sanitary facilities and to contribute cash to banks in developing countries. Debt relief for developing countries, investments in healthcare systems, protection and reconstruction of livelihoods or the direct support of funders to women (who form the majority of workers in the healthcare sector) are also solutions envisaged by OECD members. All direct aid linked to Covid-19 to countries eligible for ODA will be accounted for as ODA. The current challenge is to avoid, as much as possible, reducing ODA packages earmarked for projects identified before the crisis (economic development, empowering women, water and sanitation, urban development, fight against climate change etc.) in favour of urgent health projects to tackle Covid-19. This health crisis should be used as an “opportunity” to mobilise additional finance resources for developing countries.

THE “CHIRAC TAX”

The “Chirac tax”, created in 2006 at the initiative of the French and Brazilian presidents Jacques Chirac and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and adopted by 27 countries, is a solidarity tax on airplane tickets, designed to finance solidarity funds for development, the treatment of serious diseases (malaria, AIDS, TB) in developing countries and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A surcharge with mixed outcomes, but the idea could be taken up to finance another high-emission sector (not necessarily air travel, or not uniquely), to finance the SDGs. Therefore, everybody could at their own level contribute towards this tax: private holidaymakers, companies whose staff undertake business trips etc.

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7. CARE International (2021). Climate adaptation finance: fact or fiction?
**THE "TOBIN TAX" AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX**

Two taxes on financial transactions, with unused or barely used potential, can also be envisaged to mobilise additional financial resources in favour of developing countries: the "Tobin tax", drawn up in 1972, is a very low surcharge (between 0.05% and 0.2%) on international financial transactions with the aim of limiting speculation in order to reduce price volatility and the risk of crises. The redistribution will be, first and foremost, towards the least advanced countries. The Tobin tax has never been implemented and is now one of the key demands of the anti-globalisation movement, notably the ATTAC association. The European Union Financial Transaction Tax (EU FTT), proposed by the European Commission and supported by 11 Member States, should have been implemented by 1 January 2016 at the latest, but disagreements on the distribution of the tax revenues arise every time it is brought up again. At the French level, this tax was implemented in 2012, and a portion of collections is allocated to the development solidarity fund. This is no longer calculated as a percentage since 2017, but as a fixed sum of 528 million euro. This type of innovative finance will enable each actor to directly contribute towards the mobilisation of supplementary financing for developing countries.

**GREEN BONDS**

Green bonds provide financing for projects, which are selected on the basis of extra-financial criterion. France became the leading global issuer of green bonds in 2020, ahead of the United States and the Netherlands. The uptake of green bonds is growing but remains marginal. Green bonds are still mainly used by developed countries. The bonds are still in their infancy in developing countries and continue to only represent a small portion of climate financing. Therefore, they could be an interesting route for developing countries to pursue.
Debt relief for poor countries

Managing debt has been a key economic principle over recent years. It has often been held up as a cardinal virtue thanks to key indicators as, until recently, the European rule known as “3%”, that aims to prohibit public deficit in the euro zone exceeding 3% of GDP. While often debated, and sometimes even decried, these indicators are the expression of a commonly accepted idea that “debt must be controlled”. Since 2020, major international organisations have been working hard under the framework of the Paris Club to find ways of reducing this debt, but for many this debt relief is insufficient, and the debts of poor countries have only been cancelled in part. In reality, attempts to write off debts in the early 2000s were accompanied by “structural adjustments” that were imposed in exchange, which reduced essential public services such as education or healthcare.

In 1996, the World Bank launched an initiative in favour of highly indebted poor countries (HIPC); it was completed in 2005 with multilateral debt relief in the form of cancellation by 3 institutions, the IMF, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank and the African Development Fund (ADF). However, in 2017 a Standard & Poor study concluded that it was a virtual failure because many beneficiary countries are no less indebted that before.

Many countries have experienced a “debt crisis”, often a dramatic moment where the state no longer has the resources required to repay its public debt, and worse still to continue taking out loans (and thus to invest or simply survive). This happened to developing countries at the start of the 1980s, and more recently, the crisis that rocked Greece and the euro zone in 2010. If indebtedment is often necessary for a country (particularly to invest), the fear of “excessive debt” often surfaces.

All in debt?

These crises do not only concern poor countries. In OECD countries, the debt-to-GDP ratio was recently bordering on around 100%, and for several years Japan had already reached the 200% of GDP mark. However, the effects of worsening debt do not have the same impact on the poorest and wealthiest countries because indebtedment is primarily a matter of management, with key questions that relate as much to an economic rationale as to political choices. The responses to these allow for providing a very specific definition of one’s “management”: what is the nature of the debt (private, public)? what is the purpose of the debt? to invest? to pay back...other debts? How is it structured (short term, long term)? Who holds the debt? What is the debt dynamic in the sub-region or the economic community to which the country belongs? Can the debt be reduced? Restructured? Cancelled? ......

The Covid debt

The health crisis is shaking up debt-related dogmas for all countries, firstly in terms of its size: Pandemic-related aid created 24,000 billion dollars of additional debt last year, bringing the global debt to a record level of 281,000 billion dollars (233,330 billion euro) and the global debt-to-GDP ratio to more than 355%. Debt, as a ratio of global economic output (GDP), increased by 35 percentage points, and this is more than 20 points above that generated by the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. The debate around debt cancellation is becoming a global one and is going far beyond the debt of poor countries, which is revolutionising the thinking of financial institutions.

Numerous NGOs and institutions are advocating for the cancellation of Covid debts and believe that the new debt restructuring framework for these countries is insufficient. In fact, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have called for the G20 countries to put in place the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). The DSSI helps countries to focus their resources on the fight against the pandemic and to protect the life and livelihoods of millions of vulnerable persons. Since its entry into force on 1 May 2020, it has allowed for debt relief for more than 40 countries, for a total amount of approximately 5 billion dollars.

This SDG 17 target is therefore being put forward in new financial and geopolitical times.

Sustainable development issues are very much impacted by this question because future generations should not have to support a financial debt that prevents them from making the investments they need. In reality, debt management primarily allows for ensuring an investment policy. These investments are essential to respond to the challenges of SDG 17. All actors are being posed a key question: how do we ensure that the imperative of collecting a country’s debt does not hinder its development? This question focuses the debate less around the alarming question of repaying the debt, and more around initial economic choices – short term or long term – that structure the indebtedment process. This is why the IMF and the World Bank have set up a task force to reflect on concrete “creative” debt relief options, in exchange for “green” investments, something that will be discussed at COP26.

The duty to invest in very poor countries

Very few rich countries have achieved the promise made to allocate 0.7% of GDP to aid for developing countries, and ODA as well as other international development assistance will not be sufficient to finance the investment needed to achieve the SDGs. In this context, the need to increase the amount of private and public investment in LDCs has been demonstrated. Investing in a responsible economy, in essential services, social inclusion and the reduction of inequalities (healthcare, education, water and sanitation, fight against poverty, gender equality), and preserving the planet (ecology, climate, biodiversity) must be priorities.

Public investment (by governments, local authorities, ODA) must strengthen the capacities of developing countries to invest internally (by decentralising their competences to local authorities), but also to gear private investment towards environmental transition and sustainable development in LDCs, by offering investors visibility for years to come. These capital contributions are crucial for the economic, political, financial, and sustainable green development of developing countries. According to a report published by the World Bank Group, foreign direct investment (FDI) makes it possible to reduce the unequal and unbalanced development that still exists and progress towards a less unequal and destabilised world.

A very specific question

The period covered by the eight objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) between 2000 and 2015 saw a net improvement in the economic and social situation of LDCs: poverty reduction, increased rate of schooling, health indicators rising etc. Four countries were able to be re-categorised between 2007 and 2017. However, these figures are far from the ones envisaged by the international community in 2011. LDCs are intrinsically very vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and are highly dependent upon official development assistance (ODA) to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to make their economies more resilient, because private investment remains limited. Adaptation finance is solely geared towards sectors where the territories are the most profitable (notably African LDCs that are rich in natural resources), leaving to one side the most vulnerable or those whose environmental, legal, political and economic frameworks are rather unstable. With the crisis provoked by the Covid-19 pandemic, foreign direct investment around the world fell by 42% in 2020 and will remain low in 2021. At the same time, the drop in the revenue of multinational companies reduces the potential for investment that is crucial for sustainable recovery in LDCs.
Moreover, in spite of the pressing need for investment, private international funds allocated to four of the 10 areas of action linked to SDGs have not particularly increased since their adoption in 2015, according to the UN’s World Investment Report 2020. While more than 150 countries have adopted national sustainable development strategies or modified their development plans to take the SDGs into account, strategies that contain specific orientations for the promotion of investment in favour of LDCs are rare. Initiatives to encourage investment exist, but rarely cover several key sectors such as healthcare, water and sanitation, education and adaptation to climate change. Since the adoption of the SDGs, the measures taken around the world to liberalise or facilitate investment (essentially in transport, innovation, agriculture and food) are far from sufficient to re-orientate the entire national investment schedule in favour of the SDGs. This is all the more surprising given that the funds available in the international financial system could be sufficient to fill the financing gap for the SDGs. According to Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the OECD, reallocating only 1.1% of the $379,000 trillion of assets held by banks, institutional investors and asset managers would be sufficient to implement sustainable financing that is compatible with the SDGs.

The true key to boosting LDCs

According to 2017 estimates, investing in SDGs would allow significant economic opportunities to flourish, and would generate up to 380 million jobs, mainly in developing countries. According to the Global Commission on Adaptation: “a US$1.8 trillion investment in the areas of early warning systems, climate-resilient infrastructure, improved dryland agriculture, global mangrove protection and resilient water resources could generate US$7.1 trillion of avoided costs and non-monetary social and environmental benefits”. Therefore, adaptation appears to be a potentially profitable sector and attractive to investors, on the condition that a certain number of precautions are taken, particularly in terms of risk management and the reduced vulnerability to shocks.

Financial instruments to mobilise additional resources to finance sustainable infrastructure have increased, and still have untapped potential, but their use remains low in LDCs. These diverse financial resources, coupled with the mobilisation of internal resources, the strengthening of international aid, the introduction of new tools such as sustainable investment criteria, the principles of transparent reporting on climate change and the integration of climate-related risks in investment decisions, make LDCs more attractive to investors and will allow them to access new private or public sustainable development funds, while reducing their vulnerability.

UNCTAD has established a new action plan consisting of 6 measures to mobilise and orientate investments, and to optimise outcomes, tasks which are particularly difficult in developing countries: integrate the SDGs into national framework agreements for investment and into international investment agreement mechanisms; re-orientate strategies to promote and facilitate investments in favour of SDGs; draw up regional investment agreements in favour of SDGs; encourage new forms of partnership for investments in favour of SDGs; increase consideration of ESG matters on capital markets with the implementation of a global mechanism to monitor and harmonise published reporting; create a global shift in thinking in the corporate sector.

In this context, the post-pandemic G20 has stated that “no efforts will be spared” to support the global economy during and after the Covid crisis. With this in mind, a proposal was made with a view to creating an “FDI facility” armed with sufficient resources or to broaden the mandate set out in the Aid-for-Trade Initiative framework, easily accessible, to include investment aid, notably by targeting low-income countries.

FISP-CLIMAT
(A PRIVATE SECTOR INNOVATION FACILITY IN THE AREA OF CLIMATE CHANGE)

The FISP was set up by the French Facility for Global Environment (FFEM), a finance solution for developers of innovative projects in developing countries, that encourages private investments in adaptation projects in developing countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, Mediterranean zone and other developing countries). The fifth FISP-Climat call for projects, published in 2018, enables companies and consortiums made up of at least one private company, to obtain a grant or a repayable advance (for a maximum amount of €500,000), for adaptation-based or multi-disciplinary projects, and carried out with local partners.

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17. The World Investment Report: International Production Beyond the Pandemic
18. Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2019: Time to Face the Challenge
19. Adaptation Gap Report 2020
20. Adaptation Gap Report 2020
**The Framework for SDG Aligned Finance**

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and UNDP have launched the Framework for SDG Aligned Finance, an initiative aimed at helping public and private actors to identify and prioritise investments that contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Presented at the Paris Peace Forum, this framework identifies solutions to shift the trillions of dollars available internationally towards more sustainable and resilient investments, and to further mobilize investment, especially to least developed countries, small islands developing states, and developing countries.


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**A Matrix of SDG-Related Indicators by the NGO Cerise**

The NGO Cerise has created a matrix of easy-to-use micro-economic indicators for SDG targets, that can be directly used by social enterprises. The purpose of this initiative is to encourage the emergence of an ecosystem that helps social entrepreneurial projects in developing countries to flourish.

https://cerise-spm.org/en/
Science and Cooperation

“The only route that offers any hope of a better future for all humanity is that of cooperation and partnership.” This is how Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressed himself during a speech to the UN General Assembly, on 24 September 2001, emphasising the urgent need to work together in every field, whether operational or at the level of sharing knowledge.

Before the global pandemic, global economic growth allowed SDGs to realise progress, but one observes deepening inequalities, particularly regarding access to scientific and technological resources. In addition to North-South inequalities, there are also development disparities between nations, regions and territories in the South.

How can we avoid leaving some behind at a time when international bodies are urgeing us to think of development beyond the short-term and one’s own interests? Target 6 of the SDG 17 could provide a partial solution through its focus on cooperation as a way of improving integration and enhancing access to science, technology and innovation, countries and territories. Whether multilateral, triangular, cross-border, local or decentralised, cooperation makes it possible to consider development as a tool for multi-party co-construction. International institutions, governments, research institutes, associations and businesses can all contribute to accelerating partnership initiatives in the areas of research and innovation.

This was the reason for establishing the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals (STI Forum). The Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation is part of the Technology Facilitation Mechanism, established by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which was then launched by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in order to support the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Forum is organised by the United Nations Inter-Agency Task Team on Science, Technology and Innovation for the SDGs and is supported by a group of 10 high-level representatives of the private sector, the scientific community and civil society appointed by the

Une application mobile permet d’aider les éleveurs kényans à lutter contre la sécheresse l’ITU/Trans.Lieu (2018).
UN Secretary-General\textsuperscript{22}.

We should also cite the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP), which brings together three pre-existing networks of Academies of Engineering and Technological Sciences, in particular the IAP, the global network of science academies, the InterAcademy Medical Panel (IAMP) and the InterAcademy Council (IAC).

\textbf{The importance of access to scientific data}

We consequently understand, for example, why the struggle against the technological divide must be fought on a common front: to ensure that all actors, on all levels, can have access to the same quality tools (computing, digital, Internet) creating a common language that would facilitate cooperation and innovation in a number of areas: health, education, environment, access to information or to particular services, whether they are financial (e-banking), commercial (e-commerce), or related to data storage (cloud computing) etc. In 2017, the OECD published a detailed report on the data required for development by 2030, advocating for a system and a database, like the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), a measuring tool that systematically tracks global resources invested in development destined for developing countries, as well as a broader range of players, in order to enhance transparency. The United Nations identified the “big data” required for the 2030 Agenda.

Thus, working towards close cooperation between stakeholders and mechanisms amounts to ensuring that any proposed solutions respond as much to the challenges as to the regulatory and legal frameworks that correspond to the implementation level of programmes. Enhancing cooperation structures in various sectors (WTO, WHO, IMO, IAEA, etc.) seems to be an appropriate strategy if we want to see a world in which our development model draws crucial strength from the implementation of multi-scale and multi-sector partnerships.

\textbf{The ARABPAT Project: A Platform to Facilitate the Circulation of Patents in Countries of the South}

Developed thanks to the support of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO), the ARABPAT platform is a collaborative project intended to facilitate the production, publication and exchange of information related to patents in Arabic, English and French between the patent offices of Arab countries in order to support innovation in this region. This platform for disseminating patent information is open to industrial property offices in Arab countries that wish to contribute to a wider dissemination of innovation and knowledge-sharing in the region.

\textbf{The COVID-19 Technology Access Pool of the World Health Organisation (WHO)}

The COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) is an initiative seeks to improve access to all treatments, vaccines, tests and other technologies to fight COVID-19. This programme relies upon data from existing mechanisms, such as the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) and the Tech Access Partnership of the United Nations Technology Bank. It offers a point of entry so that the international community can pool scientific knowledge, data and intellectual property. It strives to accelerate the discovery of vaccines, medicines and other technologies thanks to freely accessible scientific research, and primarily destined for the least developed countries.

\textbf{MOOCs to Enhance Digital Skills by the Orange Digital Center and GIZ}

The digitalisation of information and work is leading to the increased value of IT-related skills. In the context of cooperation with several African countries, Orange Digital Center and the GIZ (German development agency) are offering online classes to train students or young graduates in this key area, in view of their imminent integration into the labour market. In addition to training sessions, online encounters are also organised with experts around the world in order to follow the latest technological developments.

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The key to success for SDGs in developing countries: green technologies

The development, transfer and dissemination of environmentally friendly technologies give rise to significant political and economic challenges. The creation of green technologies (green innovation) is a driver of growth for every single country. It requires significant and targeted financing, the introduction of incentives, facilitated access to knowledge and training, and appropriate public policies. More than half of the SDGs require green technology solutions to achieve them.

According to the IPCC definition, the transfer of environmentally sound technologies involves a broad set of processes covering the exchange of knowledge, money and goods amongst different stakeholders that lead to the spreading of technology for adapting to or mitigating climate change. The word “transfer” encompasses both diffusion of technologies and cooperation across and within countries.

Article 10 of the PARIS Agreement added a technological mechanism created by the Cancun Conference in 2010, the obligation to develop “a long-term vision” for technology transfer.

While they are indispensable for combating climate change of global pandemics like COVID-19, these transfers still face numerous barriers: economic and financial, legal and regulatory (in particular as concerns patents), commercial, cultural, weak institutional and organisational capacities, local skill shortages, etc. Thus, the transfer of technologies towards developing countries is costly and cannot be borne by these countries alone. Similarly, it requires an initial adaptation of technologies to local realities and widespread access to digital tools, which are factors in diffusion and inclusiveness.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships for the transfer of green technologies

Target 7 of SDG 17 therefore impels us to remove the barriers to developing multi-stakeholder partnerships (economic and social, public, associative), including North-South partnerships, which are the engines of knowledge and technology transfers. It also provides an impetus to sign multilateral or bilateral agreements to define the rules governing technology transfers, as well as any preferential treatment accorded.

In order to give substance to the technological mechanism, WIPO created the WIPO GREEN platform, a public-private partnership that "unites green tech innovators and those seeking green solutions, public and private entities supporting climate-friendly tech, as well as experts in green innovation and other relevant fields".

The European Union, like France, encourages green innovation and includes the transfer of green technologies in its development assistance objectives. Thus, French scientific institutes are establishing transfers schemes such as CIRAD INNOV, a French agricultural research agency for sustainable development in the tropics.

At regional authority level, sharing knowledge and technologies among local and regional players in order to energise them is an important issue and a key objective of solidarity policy (decentralised cooperation) vis-à-vis developing countries.

23. WIPO - WIPO GREEN: supporting green innovation and technology transfer.

On 22 October 2020, representatives of local, regional, national and European authorities met with NGOs, businesses, and citizens to launch the Green City Accord (GCA). This effort is focused on accelerating the green transition of European cities, with the methodological support of a platform, indicators for the 2030 Agenda, and through the exchange of expertise, best practices and know-how between cities who have signed the Accord, such as Lille, Florence, Porto and Fribourg. Each city sets out its proposed actions to make improvements in 5 areas: air quality, water quality, urban biodiversity, the circular economy and noise pollution.

https://eurocities.eu/latest/the-green-city-accord-is-here/

THE SAFE WATER CUBE DRINKING WATER FOUNTAIN

(Association & citizens)

The Safe Water Cube drinking water fountain is a simple device that is easy to use and sustainable. It can supply 1,000 people and be maintained by 2 paid village technicians. This model, piloted and designed by a French engineer, has been propagated in rural areas of developing countries, mainly in Africa. It has provided 500 people with paid work thanks to 250 fountains located in 14 countries.


THE GREEN CITY ACCORD OF EUROPEAN CITIES: A SHARED VISION OF A GREEN URBAN FUTURE

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https://eurocities.eu/latest/the-green-city-accord-is-here/
Combatting the digital divide

Leveraging science and technology as well as development and innovation are indispensable to the implementation of a sustainable development policy, as we are particularly reminded by SDG 9. For this reason, the dynamics of cooperation called for by SDG 17 must take into consideration this specific issue. In this respect, concerning the Internet, figures from the World Bank in 2018 reported a rate of 50.763% of Internet users in the world, compared to 28.706% in 2010. The strong growth in this curve, however, masks the fact that large disparities remain: while the rate has risen to 83% for OECD countries, it is only 18% for the least developed countries. Moreover, this curve, does not take into account the digital divide and the disparity between users: besides the international digital divide, LDCs are confronted with a domestic digital divide between the sexes, which is widening.

The proportion of men in LDCs who use the Internet is more than twice that of women.

Two key problems must be addressed: How to promote the circulation and transfer of knowledge and technology and put them to use in the service of sustainable development? How to improve use of the Internet to make it truly a vehicle for the transfer of knowledge and technology?

Admittedly, in Africa, international initiatives that aim to help Africa enter the digital age are numerous, such as the Digital Economy for Africa Initiative, (DE4A, World Bank), the Nairobi Manifesto on the Digital Economy and Inclusive Development in Africa (UNCTAD), as well as African projects such as the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa. But it is essential that the LDCs also join the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) and the digital economy; yet, they have
not even fully integrated the three previous industrial revolutions into their production base. The effort is therefore even more important, even if this delay could help Africa avoid the negative externalities of the Western World, especially in the digital sector, where use must be controlled in order to avoid, in particular, the exponential increase in energy use by servers.

The UN Technology Bank

The first element of the target may be considered as attained with the 2018 launch of the United Nations Technology Bank for Least Developed Countries. Headed up by Joshua Setipa, its tasks include conducting studies, reviews and assessments and identifying deficiencies and needs in order to formulate recommendations for coherent strategies in the field, while also looking to implement regional innovation hubs. It is supported by UNCTAD, UNESCO and Research4Life, a group of five research programmes focused on health, agriculture, the environment and other life sciences, and physical and social sciences.

Digital divides also exist in rich countries

Thus, while in France 83% of the population uses the Internet, a study by INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] underscores the fact that 38% of these users have insufficient digital skills and 17% of the population is digitally illiterate. Besides the development of appropriate software tools and resources, target 8 will only be fully achieved on the condition of rolling out digital mediation activities intended for the entire population.

Free software, and the associated open source approach, is distinguished from the proprietary approach by allowing dissemination, sharing and modification of software, whose source code is freely accessible. The advantages of this approach are to facilitate permanent improvements in software and appropriation of the uses associated with it. As an example, a software programme such as OpenYalin offers a solution for transmission of medical imaging to developing countries. Orange Labs is behind Emerginov, whose code was opened in 2012, offering a complete toolbox to develop accessible services by mobile device. The platform makes it possible to create libraries of business applications and generate local content.
Cooperating for SDGs

Capacity-building is defined as strengthening the skills, methods, tools and processes by which organisations and communities can “survive, adapt, and thrive in a fast-changing world” (source UN). In this sense, it is somewhat like the notion of being able to act, as much on the individual as on the collective level. Capacity-building thus plays an essential role in the realisation of the 2030 Agenda because it describes the condition by which individuals, communities, agencies and governments are capable of implementing actions and solutions leading to sustainable development.

The title of the goal concerns developing countries. But, as highlighted by the 2030 Agenda, “we are all countries on the road to sustainable development” and a broader understanding of this target may take shape. Capacity-building is a shared challenge, and acquisition of capacities to produce a necessary change by which societies ensure their sustainability, happens through cooperation. Cooperation assumes transmission as well as pooling, that is to say, mechanisms by which each stakeholder strengthens its skills and its capacity to act.

But achieving the SDGs is colliding with the global issue of capacities, particularly in Africa, because many countries suffer from a lack of essential skills and fragile institutions, while public initiatives are crucial for achieving SDGs.

Therefore, programmes for women’s education, support for think tanks, and assessment systems are essential, particularly with regard to improving statistical services; indeed, SDGs are imposing more and more tasks on national and international statistical bodies, (data on vulnerable populations or collection of new data for benchmarks associated with SDGs).
The Cape Town Global Action Plan

The United Nations’ Cape Town Global Action Plan for Sustainable Development Data (UNSC, 2017) is the roadmap designed to improve global data in support of sustainable development and to define the role of cooperation providers. It provides a framework for planning and implementing statistical capacity-building proportional to the scale of the aspirations of the 2030 Agenda.

The Global Action Plan recommends actions in six strategic areas, each one associated with several goals:

- Coordination and strategic leadership on data for sustainable development;
- Innovation and modernisation of national statistical systems;
- Strengthening of basic statistical activities and programmes;
- Dissemination and use of sustainable development data;
- Multi-stakeholder partnerships;
- Mobilise resources and coordinate efforts for statistical capacity building.

PROJET RÉGION OCCITANIE — ASSOCIATION DES RÉGIONS DU MAROC
[OCCTANIA REGION — ASSOCIATION OF THE REGIONS OF MOROCCO PROJECT]

In the context of support for implementation of Morocco’s advanced regionalisation, the Association of French Regions and its counterpart, the Association of the Regions of Morocco, launched an ambitious programme to strengthen the skills of elected officials and regional executives, for which the Occitania region chose to take the lead. Initiated in June 2018, with the support of the French Development Agency (AFD), the project was implemented up until 2021 with support from the Directorate General of Local Authorities (DGCL) of Morocco. The goal is to support Morocco’s Regions in terms of building their capacity to be major players in the development of their regions, through implementation of new governance by regional action. The diagnosis that was carried out as part of this project made it possible to better ascertain the issues around training and to identify the specific needs of each Region. More than 600 elected officials and executives of the Kingdom of Morocco’s 12 Regions were targeted by this programme. At the beginning of 2021, this also led to the signing of bilateral agreements by the Occitania region with three Moroccan regions (Fès-Meknès, the Oriental and Casablanca-Settat) for pursuing cooperation in relationship with the respective needs of each regional territory (agriculture and digital for Fès-Meknès; the social economy and solidarity for the Oriental; and professional training, research and innovation with Casablanca-Settat).

COOPERER AUTREMENT EN ACTEUR DE CHANGEMENT - CFSI
[COOPERATING DIFFERENTLY AS AN ACTOR FOR CHANGE]

With the Cooperating Differently as an Actor for Change programme, the CFSI [French Committee for International Solidarity] applies the principles of developing the capacity to cooperate between regions, while offering not a top-down approach, but one that places each of the stakeholders in a position of mutual contributions. Nine initiatives, mobilising more than 70 partners, have thus been supported between 2014 and 2018.

Cooperative projects initiated by this programme concern, among other things, economic development and even training programmes. In Mali, the Gerén [Group for the Environment, Renewable Energy and Solidarity] worked with its local partner to create an electrified business zone. In Guinea, the Guinea 44 organisation worked with Maison Familiales Rurales [Rural Family Homes] to create a job-training programme.
The Doha Round

How do you explain the challenge of such an objective without revisiting the fundamentals that underlie the global effort required by this objective to reach a more equitable trading system? First of all, by “trading system,” it is understood that it mainly means “commercial transactions” between countries, i.e., from the perspective of an economist a measure of equilibrium between imports and exports of commodities, goods and services. The equilibrium or disequilibrium of this balance is even more keenly evident in structural factors in poorly or underdeveloped economies, particularly in countries of the South.

The multilateral trading system is governed by multiple forums on different levels (national, intra-regional, community-based), and on the international level by the WTO, which plays the role of promoting and policing a certain number of rules (or their absence!). Thus, the central question that is posed recurrently is to know if these rules are fair or not for the stakeholders, or to the contrary, if they introduce systemic imbalance, particularly between rich countries and poor countries.

Finally, to meet these trading challenges (to which the qualifier is “non-discriminatory”) and the potential imbalance (to which the qualifier is “equitable”), the Doha Round represents the very latest cycle of trade negotiations between members of the WTO. It’s intended to profoundly reform the international trade system by reducing obstacles to trade and revising trade rules. The working programme includes about 20 areas. The Round is also called semi-officially the Doha Development Agenda because one of the principal goals is to improve trading opportunities for developing countries. The Round was officially launched at the fourth ministerial conference of the WTO, held in Doha (Qatar), in November 2001. The end of the Doha Round was scheduled for 1 January 2005... but is still ongoing. For there is still much to do.
After Doha: the emergence of a new approach

In Bali in 2013 followed by Nairobi in 2015, the “package” agreements were completed. The goal was to make progress with targeted consensual packages on the facilitation of trade, development and food security.

In 2015, the final package was summarised as:

- Export competition: elimination of export subsidies;
- Enhanced transparency on the issues of regulations, but without results;
- A “development” component, including rules of origin where there was a convergence on areas of interests, but a divergence on the ways to address them.

If the WTO’s eleventh Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires (from 10 to 13 December 2017) was supposed to bring important advances to the Doha programme, it brought only very limited results. As a matter of fact, it concluded with only a commitment to continue work on a certain number of issues, without establishing any detailed working programmes and with various declarations by groups of countries on subjects of common interest. The twelfth Ministerial Conference scheduled for June 2020 in Kazakhstan was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic; it may now take place in June 2021.

A renewal of trade negotiations for the developing world?

Behind the simple historical and institutional description of this international dynamic are all the complex issues that underlie the multiplying areas of “negotiation”. The major importance of commercial trade for development was recognised by the High-Level Panel (HLP), which was charged by the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon to formulate recommendations on a post-2015 global development agenda. In its report published in 2013, the High-Level Panel affirmed the importance of “ensuring that the global trading system is open and fair and creates the platform for countries to grow” as prerequisite for building a “world in 2030 that is more equal, more prosperous, more peaceful and more just than that of today.” (HLP, 2013). But if that resulted in the SDG 17 target, the “universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable” character is not self-evident. Therefore, this key idea emerged early on, according to which corrective measures should have been introduced: for civil society, we can cite movements around “fair trade”, which affect the consumer-citizen, even if for the WTO the issue was also only discussed with initiatives such as Aid for Trade, and also created to help countries reach their development goals. The fairness of trade, and its sustainability, requires the WTO to enforce social and environmental clauses that are far too tentative.

Today, the tendency is for bilateral regional agreements dealing with Trans-Atlantic free trade (TAFTA, TTIP, CETA, etc.) or pluri-lateral sectoral accords, which only deal with market access (no domestic support or export subsidies), with the juxtaposition of these more rapidly concluded agreements and global accords that remain on the books over the long term. We should commend the creation on 1 January 2021 of AfCFTA, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, signed by all African Union nations except Eritrea. It is one of the great flagship projects of the African Union’s Agenda 2063. It is intended, in particular, to increase intra-African trade, which represents only 17% of exports from member countries, compared to 59% for Asia and 69% for Europe.

THE WTO’S AID FOR TRADE INITIATIVE

The Aid for Trade initiative, piloted by the WTO, aims to “help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade” (WTO, 2006b). The initiative relies upon an assumption according to which most developing countries have only weak trading capacities (even if certain countries offer promising prospects), and the liberalisation of trade is not enough, by itself, to create the necessary incentives to encourage economic reform on a larger scale.

https://www.wto.org/french/tratop_f/ devel_f/a41_f/g21_f/g21_f.htm
Yemen, the only country in the Middle East to be considered an LDC, has been affiliated with the WTO over thirteen years of negotiations. It is running up against major obstacles in its efforts to rationalise customs procedures and ensure its economic security in general.

Fuel accounts for two thirds of its exports – products that are particularly sensitive to price fluctuations and the negative effects of political instability. The share of trade in Yemen’s GDP, however, reached 67.5% in 2012, despite the country’s problems. However, tax revenue represented only 7.3% of GDP in 2013 — a figure significantly lower than the regional average (18.4%). The inability of Yemen to recoup its potential tax revenues is explained in large part by the corruption and weakness of government institutions. Even if the country, like its donors, has prioritised its customs services and government in general; the reform process has been hobbled by budgetary constraints. Obtaining the assurance of support from the international community — in accordance with the Doha and Bali Accords — will be determinant in overcoming these stumbling blocks.

Fair trade offers an economic model of fair and equal trade that contrasts with the predominant economic model by recognising that supply and demand are not the only components taken into account to set a fair price for goods and services. It seems that on the market, prices are often defined by power relationships and do not always take into account the social and environmental costs. Fair trade tends therefore to redefine the functioning of international economic transactions by including therein the socio-environmental concerns.

At the end of 2018, fair trade posted revenues of 1.276 billion euro in France and 6 billion euro per year worldwide, including 60% in Europe. This sector involves nearly 1.7 million workers, of which 40% are women. The sales of made in France fair trade networks now represent 34% of the total compared to 66% for international networks located in 72 countries worldwide.

https://www.artisansdumonde.org
Target 11  

EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Make it possible for LDCs to export

For several decades, trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the least developed countries (LDCs). It is recognised as a tool that makes it possible to accelerate the attainment of numerous SDGs, such as those related to poverty (SDG 1), hunger (SDG 2), health (SDG 3) gender equality (SDG 5), decent employment and economic growth (SDG 8). For the LDCs, trade therefore has a positive impact on a country’s economic and social health. But if their participation in the services sector of international trade is weak, it is dissimilar to that of goods.

While the share of exports of their goods in the global economy has seen a rise steadily until the mid-2000s, this level dropped drastically between 2000 and 2015, before climbing again in recent years. Thus, the LDCs’ share of goods exports in global exports fell to 0.97% in 2015, hence settling at less than 1% for the first time since 2007. The 2008 global financial crisis did not generate any substantial decrease with respect to LDCs. By contrast, these countries were seriously affected by the slowdown in trade observed in 2015-2016. At issue, the fluctuation of prices and the demand for fossil fuels and mining products, on which the LDCs are economically very dependent at the level of their exports, and China’s decrease in internal trade. In 2015, the trade deficit of LDCs reached a record high of $87 billion, or 44% more than in 2014, and 134% more than in 2013.
Risk of failure of the Istanbul Programme of Action after COVID

Inspired by the Istanbul Programme of Action for LDCs for 2011-2020, target 11 forecast a doubling of the share of global exports by LDCs by 2020, or 2.1%. Yet, for the moment it is stagnant, even without accounting for the general collapse due to the COVID 19 pandemic.

During negotiations in 2015, there was discussion on the necessity of a specific target for reducing the costs of trade (internal politics, NCDs at the national level and abroad, deficiencies in transportation and logistics, restrictive policies on trade in services and investment generally) in the post-2015 development programme. Non-tariff hurdles, restrictions to the trade of services in developing countries, inefficient border management as well as genuine sources of trade costs have been inadequately targeted, but this has been successfully done by the member governments of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation.

The first victims of this very difficult economic pattern are the people of these countries. The growth of exports from LDCs as a part of global exports would thus seem a physical as much as a moral necessity for the survival of a great number of people whose material conditions of life directly depend on it. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a much greater impact on the trade of LDCs (at least 40% drop compared to 13% on a global level).

As such, the crises that we have encountered over several years are repeated reminders. Can we still contemplate addressing an economic subject without reflecting on its ecological, political or social consequences? Liberalisation of markets may lead to growth in revenues for a country and the standard of living for its inhabitants, but it does so to the detriment of the environment whose degradation will undermine these indicators. According to the IPCC, nearly 200 million people living in India will live in regions exposed to deadly heatwaves. Rising temperatures could threaten the country’s economic upswing: “between 2.5 and 4.5% of its GDP could be affected by this risk.”

One of the paths to improvement is development of trade by LDCs with countries in the Southern hemisphere – particularly in using trade preferences granted by China and India – while exploiting preferential conditions from which they benefit for access to traditional export markets in these developed countries. Future growth of LDCs could therefore also play out with a better balance of exports between rich countries and LDCs. In order for the latter to participate in the global market, growing their share of exports, and enjoying stronger growth while preserving ecological coherence, it is up to the developed countries to think about changing their model, for growth that considers benchmarks other than GDP, such as the HDI or the HPI. If this is not addressed in time, the question of a new model linked to exports risks being determined by ecological constraints and ecological degeneration. In this respect, these countries are thus well positioned to benefit from the EU’s Green Deal, which will give priority by supporting value chains and consumption patterns that are socially responsible and respectful of the environment in order to receive Trade Assistance.

THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA PROJECT

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), whose decision to launch a project was taken during the 18th ordinary session of the African Union Conference in 2019, is a project which aims to create a tripartite free-trade zone, whose entities would include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Over time, the goal is to integrate all 55 African Union countries into the zone, for the purpose of diversifying their exports, accelerating growth, strengthening intra-African trade, and attracting direct foreign investment.


THE ENHANCED INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK INITIATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION (ITC)

Conceived as the only multilateral partnership intended to help least developed countries to use trade as an engine for growth, sustainable development and reducing poverty. The ITC promotes cooperation with LDCs while actively participating in the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF). This initiative brings together several stakeholders, which constitute the most important trade assistance for LDCs. The ITC collaborates closely with LDC partners in order to support all of the programme’s LDCs in areas related to development of exports.

https://www.wto.org/french/tratop_f/devel_f/tgccop_f/if_f.htm
Target 12 of SDG 17 emphasises an important point in the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals: the fact that one cannot hope to create a sustainable system in a world still characterised by inequalities and where these are growing year by year.

Kate Raworth’s “doughnut theory” is a good way to explain this. According to the economist, “social justice”, which can be compared to economic and social development, defines the internal confines that she calls the “floor”. This floor is composed of human rights and essential needs to ensure people’s fulfilment and thus, development. The “ceiling” corresponds, for its part, to the environmental challenges. Thus, once development is assured, a “safe and just space for humanity, and inclusive and sustainable economic growth” may be attained.

This objective underscores the importance for countries of growing together in harmony and is therefore crucial for sustainable development. One of the objectives is to allow access to international trade to all countries. The least developed countries (LDCs), which are still members of international trade relationships, must participate even more in order that each country is “in a position to ensure its own development” as is the meaning of SDG 17 on trade.

A look at the evolution of LDCs in global trade

Historically, the part of the world once called “the Third World,” comprising the least developed countries, had the least share of global trade with developed countries. The share of LDCs in global trade still remains marginal today: since 2005, it has seen weak growth, and even a decline in recent years. In fact, the number of countries considered “least developed countries” has risen to 46 at the beginning of 2021, or 23% of countries in the world; LDCs contain 14% of the world’s population as of December 2020, but nonetheless only represent 1% of world trade.

Focus on preferential non-reciprocal rules in favour of LDCs

It is, therefore, essential that developed countries promote the import of products from LDCs. To do so, developed countries are encouraged to apply preferential rules favouring trade with LDCs, to allow for an increase in their share of world trade, and to favour growth and the reduction of commercial inequalities between the most and least developed countries. With the ministerial decisions of 2013 and 2015, the World Trade Organization (WTO) authorised preferential non-reciprocal rules favouring LDCs. They translate today into the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), in which is embodied the Everything But Arms campaign, thanks to which the LDCs benefit from total exoneration from customs duties on all their products, accept armaments.

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26. WTO – Least Developed Countries.
27. UN Information.
Europe’s (Green) Ideas

Nevertheless, it is contemplated in Europe to use tariffs at the borders to accelerate the ecological transition: high taxes on imports of products that do not respect the planet, in this way encouraging best practices by trading partners. Access to markets under any conditions may be in conflict with sustainable development goals. If access to the market is a necessary condition to reduce inequalities and thus for the development of a more just and sustainable world, it is all the same important to ask in which goods and services we want to see increased trade.

THE STANDARDS AND TRADE DEVELOPMENT FACILITY

The Standards and Trade Development Facility is a joint initiative of the WTO and the WHO, the World Bank, the World Organisation for Animal Health and the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation. It provides a place to share information on past, present and future activities for technical cooperation in the area of sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS). Among other things, it allows LDCs, thanks to financing under the form of gifts for projects and the preparation of projects, to strengthen their capacity to implement international sanitary and phytosanitary standards, guidelines and recommendations with a view towards improving sanitary, phytosanitary and animal health conditions. Thanks to this, LDCs can maintain or obtain access to international markets.

https://www.standardsfacility.org/

THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EU AND THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

The European Union signed a European Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2014 with the East African Community (EAC), comprised of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, of which 4 are considered as LDCs. Notably, this agreement provides for immediate access to a zero-rate customs duty without quotas for all exports from the EAC to the European market, with customs rules that focus on facilitating trade between the two regions and a possibility of continuing negotiations in the area of services and rules related to trade.

This EPA is notably part of the measures taken by Member States to approve access to duty-free and quota-free markets for LDCs. These measures are identified and reviewed annually by the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).


THE DOCUMENT IDENTIFYING THE DEMANDS OF LDCs

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the ministerial decision of Nairobi by the WTO, Tanzania published in 2020, on behalf of the group of LDCs, the “G/RO/W/194” document, which identifies the demands of LDCs since 2015 to strengthen the Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO), which formalises the framework for implementation of preferential and non-preferential rules. The text asks, in particular, that the CRO establish clearer responsibilities for granting Members preference with regard to monitoring the impact of their rules of origin on LDC imports and the simplification of their requirements for eligibility. All of this should lead to more simplicity and transparency concerning preferential rules in favour of LDCs.

https://www.wto.org/french/news_f/news20_f/roi_05mar20_f.htm
**Target 13**

**FULL TITLE**

Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence.

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**No sustainability without stability**

Today, the world’s stability cannot be restricted to financial stability alone, as the Global Risks Reports published over the years by the Davos Forum have acknowledged: hence, this year, “climate action failure” dominated the context of risks to global stability, along with the digital divide, setbacks suffered by young people, and growing rivalries and competition in various areas between the superpowers. That is why attention to policy coherence in the context of the 2030 Agenda, as well as strengthening multilateralism — considerably threatened today — and the Security Council’s awareness of global threats, like the pandemic and climate are crucial. Without necessarily talking, like at Davos, of “The Great Reset”, it is indispensable to reform global governance so that it can tackle major crises.

**Maintaining global stability despite COVID?**

At the time of writing, talking about global economic stability seems like a tall order. This objective so specific to SDG 17, which touches on the coherency of policies and institutional structures, has as its measuring stick the macroeconomic scorecard (GNI growth, debt levels, import/export, etc.) of the global economy. The global pandemic has upset global economic stability, even if the report of January 2021 from the IMF concludes that “the risks for financial stability are under control for the moment,” but “measures are needed to rectify financial vulnerabilities exposed by the crises.” As factors, the IMF obviously points to the rise in corporate debt, the fragility of non-banking financial institutions, the increase in sovereign debt, the challenges of market access for a certain number of developing countries and the decreased profitability of a certain number of banking systems. It also insists on the fact that emerging countries, which have significant needs for external financing, are facing immense difficulties, especially if persistent rate hikes in the United States lead to reappraisal of risks and a tightening of financial terms.

In effect, in the context of the pandemic, most developing countries do not have national resources or sufficient wiggle room in their budgets to finance intervention measures or appropriate remedies. That is why international cooperation and external funding are essential. The Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2020 presents measures to respond to the impact of the world recession and the ongoing financial crisis, particularly in the world’s poorest countries.

In order to help low-income and moderate-income countries, the UN Secretary General created the United Nations COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund. Moreover, the UN established a COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan in order to help the most vulnerable populations, particularly refugees and displaced persons inside their own countries. Furthermore, at the initiative of the World Bank and the Monetary Fund, the G20 countries decided to suspend debt servicing (DSSI). The DSSI, since it took effect on 1 May 2020, made it possible to alleviate the debt of more than 40 countries, for a total amount of approximately 5 billion dollars. The suspension period, which was initially scheduled to run until 31 December 2020, was extended until June 2021.

Ultimately, the short-term prospects for a return to stability are uncertain since two scenarios exist: a pessimistic scenario of a continued increase in infections and a delay in the roll-out of vaccines (hence, only 1.6% global growth in 2021). But if the pandemic is controlled with the acceleration of vaccinations, 5% growth remains possible.

Even so, what great news! To financially support the developing countries most affected by the pandemic, the French endorse the idea that multinational corporations operating in these countries should pay their fair share of taxes (75%). They also believe that taxing financial markets (56%), increasing development aid (45%) and cancelling the debt of the poorest countries (41%) are relevant solutions.

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And it seems someone is listening because the latest gathering of the G20 in April 2021 allowed the USA, in backing the work of the OECD, to propose a global tax rate on corporations of about 15%, which would reduce the increased public debt by supporting economies affected by the pandemic.

**The OECD and Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development**

The OECD is well-placed to work on the topic of development policy coherence thanks to its international dimension, its pluri-disciplinary skills and analyses and its direct contact with various countries.

The goal of the OECD in this area is to take advantage of the various synergies and promote policies carried out by governments while ensuring that certain countries do not impede the development of other countries by their decisions. To do this, it created a framework for policy coherence for sustainable development. This programme is reflected in the analytical, toolbox and sectorial studies work.

In the aftermath, practical recommendations were issued to guide actors in improving the coherence of these policies.


**The Need for Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development Policies to Protect Biodiversity**

The problem of development policy coherence occurs when a number of policies, advocating for certain production modes within countries that are often less developed, have devastating effects on biodiversity. Inversely, policies that protect biodiversity may not take into account the development concerns of local populations.

That is the reason for the development in recent years of policies that integrate both the social and environmental factors.

The wood sector has, in particular, multiplied its initiatives in forest management. Private certifications were used at first, such as the FSC (Forest Stewardship Council, supported by WWF), then legal requirements were put into place. They incorporate provisions to protect biodiversity. For example, criteria supported by Greenpeace on the integration of climate and biodiversity issues were added to certifications for forestry and tropical agriculture, permitting implementation of “high conservation value” zones (HCV) and high carbon stock zones (HCS), favouring their protection and conservation.


**The United Nations World Food Programme**

When the Nobel Prize was awarded to the World Food Programme, it was surely for having carried out its mission: combating hunger, but also, according to the Nobel Committee, for “for its efforts to combat hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict”. The committee highlighted that in 2019, 135 million people suffered from acute hunger, the highest number in many years. This large increase was caused in part by war and armed conflicts. It is feared, furthermore, that the number of persons suffering from hunger doubled in 2021 with the pandemic.

The Nobel Committee also emphasised that “providing assistance to increase food security not only prevents hunger, but can also help to improve prospects for stability and peace”. Indeed, Security Council resolution 2417 of 2018 emphasised the relationship between conflicts and hunger. The prize reflects simultaneously SDGs 1, 2, 3, 16 and this target of SDG 17.

https://wfp.org/
And it we read the recovery plan differently, measured against the SDGs?

The decade of action begins with an historic recovery plan. This plan must, indeed, have a palliative effect on the crisis currently caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, but it also has to lay the foundation for a new economy. At the end of 2022, there will only be eight years left to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda. This recovery plan is, therefore, the tool that makes it possible to lead France and its partners to this just, resilient and sustainable place. It is on this basis that the Elyx Foundation is proposing Action BOX2, which introduces a recovery plan through the lens of SDGs, to encourage a “change of direction” (Extract from the Sustainable Solutions Barometer 2020).

The French recovery plan and its impact on the SDGs
Target 14

Policy Coherence

Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development.

Articulate all public policies in a coherent fashion in order to promote sustainable development

In the history of development aid, the issue of coherent public policies emerged at the end of the 1990s: the Paris Declaration of 2005 presented an action programme to improve the effectiveness of aid that advocated for donor harmonisation. The fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan Partnership), held in Seoul in 2011, set out four main principles to enhance the effectiveness of development assistance. The first involves implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs.

In 2019, the European Union defined it thus: policy coherence for development aims at minimising contradictions and building synergies between different EU policies to benefit developing countries and increase the effectiveness of development cooperation. This coherence incorporates the economic, social and environmental elements of sustainable development at all levels of policymaking. It was embedded in the EU’s basic law in 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty, and was then legally reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

The principle is reaffirmed to the point of becoming a specific target of SDG 17, although it crosscuts the other 16 targets. The concept is understood in sustainable development as a whole, as defined by the UNEP in a document published in 2015: “Policy coherence of the sustainable development goals: A Natural Resource Perspective,” which highlights the impact that pressures on basic limited resources may have on full achievement of SDGs; it identifies the environmental-development compromises envisioned in the implementation of the post-2015 global sustainable development agenda by making them conditional on the coherence of development policies respecting SDGs, and thus uncoupling economic activities from the use of natural resources.

The origin of the principle is obviously the necessary coherence between the three pillars of sustainable development (economic, social and ecological). But increasing inequalities are turning what thirty years ago could have been conciliation into tensions.
Therefore, the search for coherence is now a loaded question for actors, including regional authorities engaged internationally to the extent that this search is intimately related to issues of the effectiveness of development policies and thus their legitimacy.

Experience and research on these issues have, in fact, shown that without coherence, there can be neither policy effectiveness nor sustainability for the projects undertaken.

All economic and societal actors are involved

The search for coherence extends in every direction:

- Between sectoral policies, by considering all relationships that exist between sectoral issues (education, environment, agriculture, health, etc.)
- Between regions on different levels, to enhance the continuity of action (communities, region, national, international)
- Between competencies, to draw on the complementarity of existing expertise and know-how

This search for coherence applies to all actors, regardless of their nature (non-profit, local authority, governmental, businesses, individual). The same goes for the responsibility of each person to take an interest in their own context (actors in place, activities in progress…) in order to better understand, and consequently identify the most relevant action segment in terms of their own identity.

In terms of methodology, the search for coherence refers to certain “keys to success”:

- Formation of “collaborative collectives” not necessarily institutionalised, not necessarily permanent, with a “project leader” and work practices in “project mode” or “triple helix.” This relatively flexible collective leadership makes it possible to not only strengthen control of the subject matter, but also to ensure that the project has the capacity for enhanced adaptation under changing circumstances. This project approach avoids the pitfall of a sectoral approach in isolation and naturally contributes to greater coherence.
- An inclusive approach, defining a common vision (present situation) about the future (improved situation) and about expected changes and the path taken to get there (prior diagnosis then co-construction by actors around shared goals that are approved by the parties).
- Formulating SDGs and performance indicators, adapted to the realities of the project’s region, makes it possible to articulate a common language, identify common challenges and share solutions.

The pandemic obviously shed a harsh light on the increased need for holistic coherence, and for a renewal of multilateralism, which remains the best way to ensure policy coherence.

ENSURING COHERENCY OF PUBLIC POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOCUSED ON THE “YOUTH” OBJECTIVE

Department of the Aude (France), the Hauts Bassins Region (Burkina Faso), Municipality of Sousse (Tunisia)

The starting point for this project is an analysis of the issues and challenges affecting youth in 3 regions (the Department of the Aude (France), the Hauts Bassins Region (Burkina Faso), and the Municipality of Sousse (Tunisia)), which have a percentage of young people below the poverty threshold; school dropouts; illiteracy; social problems (teenage pregnancies); vulnerabilities (delinquency, radicalisation, social exclusion, etc.).

The Aude department initiated an effort “to support implementation of shared public policies regarding youth”, with particular attention to the issue of mitigating vulnerability and insecurity. The effort is based on a “co-production of an action plan” that brings together all of the partners acting in these areas, including businesses (involved in issues of job training and apprenticeships), and the Departmental Youth Council.

This effort in the Aude is supporting bilateral cooperative projects (with Lebanon on social work, with Burkina on participation of youth and the structure of policies for youth, and with Tunisia on capacity building for youth policy). For each of these actions the SDGs constitute performance benchmarks in each of these projects.

Relying on partnerships originating from decentralised cooperation, actions were begun around the issues of youth based on the context of the Covid pandemic. This was done through a “Plea from youth for a world beyond” composed of guidelines for the implementation of coherent public policies and specific action plans in the three regions, which also constitute the basis for decentralised cooperative projects.
In 2018, the Minister for Ecological Transition, under the aegis of the General Commissioner for Sustainable Development, hoped to define a roadmap for achieving the SDGs in France. By drawing up a roadmap, the French government reaffirmed its commitment to implementing sustainable development goals at both national and international level. It meant ensuring the coherence of policies in favour of sustainable development and strengthening synergies in their implementation between the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement.

The roadmap for implementing the SDGs was led in cooperation with all of the stakeholders. It was driven by a steering committee made up of ministries and civil society. This committee, which brought together more than 300 public and private actors (NGOs, businesses, communities, unions, students, research institutes), monitors the coordination of its development and implementation, and the mobilisation of all actors.


The “groupe-pays” de Cités Unies France (a working group that brings together regional authorities involved in a given country) establishes working groups where communities, on all institutional levels, assimilate the political, economic, social and cultural context of partner countries in which institutional partners meet (including government representatives) and between them, initiate collective action on site with their partners. These working groups are representative of a logic seeking to ensure regional coherence (between communities on the one hand and the State on the other), sectoral coherence (depending on respective skills) and even international coherence (by seeking to better understand the development issues of the partner region).
Every country should democratically build its “own” sustainable development

The 15th target of SDG 17 underscores and extends the previous target, which deals with the coherency of sustainable development public policies, by placing them in an international context. It invites sustainable development actors to respect the course set (with regard to sustainable development) by the country in which the action takes place, to create its own framework for intervention. The objective draws its conclusion from the principle: “common but differentiated responsibilities”

This target refers to a position that avoids the pitfall of interference but can enhance the partnership-based approach.

As a matter of fact, the Paris Agreement provides for no sanctions in the event that a country fails to make its national contributions, but only a mechanism for promoting and facilitating the monitoring of respect for the agreement’s provisions. This mechanism will be introduced in accordance with Article 15 and will in part inspire the facilitation mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.

Respect for national sovereignty becomes an issue also in terms of methodology, setting up projects and developing strategies: beyond the field of intervention, the actors must make sure they adopt a balanced position. It is not a matter of substituting actors nor abandoning a project due to the risk of interference; a more adapted position must be identified in dialogue.

Inscribing international action in the strategic framework of a country known for its ability to lead, reinforces the efficacy and sustainability of projects undertaken, and in many ways:

- On the one hand, the project is assured of support (or at least no opposition) from the country where the action takes place.
- On the other hand, it is part of the support and reinforcement of local actors involved in this direction.
- Finally, the partner country may extend the project if it is a good match.
One way to move beyond this problem is to present reciprocity as a principle of working with partners. Respect for national sovereignty raises the question of benchmarks; what common values make cooperative action possible on development issues without necessarily acting on matters on which there is no shared vision between the countries? It also raises the question about confrontation over visions of society, economic models, political principles. How do you define “common” or “shared universal values”? How do you avoid the temptation of imposing, by force, one model of society as being the standard by which everything is measured without taking into account different realities (climate, history, social organisation, economic systems, etc.)?

Respectful cooperation provides the means for this freedom of choice

Beyond the issues of principled respect for countries piloting their own actions with regard to sustainable development, the question of sovereignty necessarily raises the question of means. A nation’s sovereignty cannot be absolute if the country does not have the minimum resources to fulfil its aspirations in terms of sustainable development. Sustainable development issues are global and go beyond borders, which requires wealthier countries to provide financial and technical support to less wealthy countries so that they can carry out sustainable development policies.

Respect for national sovereignty may raise, in certain rare cases, real ethical and political questions: in the name of coherence of sustainable development policies, an actor may question respect for national sovereignty by a partner country that might not respect the same sustainable development principles. Thus, the current debate on the Amazon forest, which, in addition to the ecological consequences of the destruction of the forest, violates the rights of indigenous peoples as defined in the universal declaration of 2007\(^{30}\) and ILO Convention 169\(^{31}\) of which Brazil is a signatory, reformulates the legitimacy of ecological intervention in an era where recognition of ecocide is increasingly being taken into account.

Haiti’s history illustrates to what extent the absence of governance and democracy, guaranteed by the constitution of 29 March 1987, renders humanitarian aid both indispensable and seldom productive. We remember the 2010 earthquake, which destroyed the region of Port-au-Prince (300,000 dead, including 60% of the country’s civil servants, 10% of local residents injured), Humanitarian aid arrived, and in six months, a million people had already benefited from emergency food aid. But reconstruction was not carried out by a failing and corrupt state: the NGOs were the only actors (one might say the “Republic of NGOs”). The Government was incapable of involving the public, to the extent that buildings that were constructed failed to be utilised. As expressed by Joel Boutroue, former special assistant to the United Nations Secretary General, a local and humanitarian coordinator for the United Nations and representative of UNDP in Haiti from 2006 to 2009, “The problem with Haiti is that of any fragile state that does not necessarily have the resources or capacity to set priorities (…) all development initiatives are in vain without the backing of good governance, that is to say, the ability of a state to make and implement policies.”

The COVID crisis, less dramatic than was feared in the country, also illustrates the consequences of the absence of strong government and infrastructures: 700,000 doses of vaccine are expected from the AstraZeneca programme for May, but there are no plans for storing it.

The World Bank’s 2017 Report on Governance and the Law emphasised three conditions for aid effectiveness, three ingredients at the heart of policy effectiveness: commitment, coordination and cooperation.

\(^{31}\) ILO - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169), 1989.

The searing backdrop of the pandemic also speaks volumes about national sovereignty regarding access to healthcare.

While most of the “major countries” (particularly France, Germany, China and South Africa), international and regional organisations (UN, QMS, European Union, Council of Europe) and organised civil society have said, in these last few months, they are in favour of recognising vaccines as “global public assets”, a nationalist reflex over the vaccine has set in, increasing inequalities, further delaying an end to the crisis and reinforcing the economic and social collapse of most of the Global South.

Thus, according to a report from the People’s Vaccine Alliance (notably comprised of the NGOs Oxfam and Amnesty International):

• 9 out of 10 people (the populations of the 70 poorest countries on Earth) will not have access to the vaccine in 2021 if governments and the pharmaceutical industry do not take emergency measures to facilitate access to vaccines,

• It will take 7 years for developing countries to gain access to vaccines that are on the market in developing countries.

Moreover, the vast majority of stocks produced by the giant pharmaceuticals have already been purchased or pre-ordered by the richest countries. Yet, an end to the COVID-19 pandemic depends upon controlling it in all the countries of the world.

The challenge posed by access to vaccines in this specific case (but beyond that, access to global public assets) demonstrates how the effects of the laws of the market on essential goods and human development can hinder a nation’s exercise of sovereignty and action in its definition and implementation its policies on access to healthcare. Defining a framework of respect and support for the sovereignty of nations in overseeing their development policies seems like the only path to attaining global sustainable development.

**ACCESS TO VACCINES AGAINST COVID-19**

ActivitY facilitates access to employment and does everything possible to bring applicants together with recruiters (training, driver’s licence, career encounters, job dating, market integration clauses, etc.). This integration agency is a partner with 400 companies and more than 100 actors in the job market, offering training, solidarity and integration via economic activity in the Yvelines. Applicants on the path towards employment are supported and trained by ActivitY’s programmes so that they meet the needs of workforce sectors that are recruiting: Construction, domestic services, hospitality, security, green space maintenance, hospitality. Companies seeking applicants can talk to ActivitY’s Business Team, which identifies profiles that are suitable for job vacancies and ready to hire. Recruiters benefit from support schemes that last up to 6 months after hiring for optimal integration.

The global partnership for sustainable development

The issues which we have to confront collectively are characterised by their complexity, because they are situated at the crossroads of multiple chains of causality and bear consequences themselves with repercussions on various facets of human activity.

The notion of a global partnership is not new, for example, the first with regard to sustainable development is the Global Water Partnership created in 1996 with the support of the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Swedish Agency for International Development, bringing together all the institutions, businesses and NGOs working in the domain of water. Likewise, for about 20 years the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) has been financing solutions that make it possible to build solid and resilient educational systems, so that more children living in low-income countries, girls especially, receive a sound education. It brings together low-income countries, donor countries, international organisations, civil society organisations (including teacher and youth organisations), the private sector and private foundations.

The 2012 report on global development partnerships noted:

The waning of support for the global partnership for development may be understandable in the context of a protracted economic and financial crisis. But the global partnership for development should be seen as a “positive-sum game”. There is positive feedback when the economies of development partner countries achieve robust growth and become dynamic markets for world trade and investment. Unsustainable pressures on the Earth’s natural limits are a further reason why the global partnership should be seen as an opportunity to yield positive-sum outcomes.

The global partnership for sustainable development has also been hit hard by the pandemic: if COVID-19 originates in the destabilisation of the natural
environment by human activity, the consequences are perceptible in several areas, and on every level: health, the economy, political power, inequality, etc. In the same way, the fight against global warming means taking into account a plurality of factors and entails every segment of society.

**A crucial and complex joint effort**

Cooperation is necessary because of the complexity. Merging knowledge with know-how makes it possible to offer adapted solutions while paying attention to the varying impacts.

The SDGs provide a framework for simulating this complexity, and SDG 17 plays an important role, which stresses most particularly target 16; of primary importance because it identifies the key notion of multi-party partnerships to which SDG 17 is often reduced. Target 16 of SDG 17 is a reminder that we will not achieve all the SDGs without cooperation. An additional point should be made clear, that of the articulation of levels. To fully achieve the SDGs and truly leave “no one behind”, cooperation must be part of all levels of action, from the very local to the international, and there must be dialogue between all involved.

Today, multiple partnerships exist and positively illustrate the cooperation that goes beyond governments, between countries, NGOs, national and international institutions, and businesses. We can cite for example Climate Chance, created during the prolongation of the Climate and Territories Summit in Lyon, which brought together actors on climate in anticipation of COP 21, the only international organisation proposing to gather on an equal footing all the non-state actors recognised by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – UNFCCC* (nine groups of actors: local communities, businesses, NGOs, unions, the scientific community, representatives of global agriculture, youth, indigenous peoples and women) to set forth priorities and common proposals, and to reinforce the dynamics of actors by building relationships (issues-based coalitions, portals for action).

The introduction of SDG 17, however, suffers from one shortcoming, which is the absence of clarification about the methodological sequence as it relates to its concrete implementation. Although it plays a central role, the SDG is presented to us without an “instruction manual”. The collective strategic impact, put forth in a series of articles in the Stanford Social Innovation Review may constitute a useful methodological approach for concrete implementation of SDGs, and more broadly for any type of pluri-actor cooperation.

This approach may concern all types of subjects: successful education, fighting addiction, improving supply chains, decontaminating a river, etc. Whatever the problem to be addressed, rather than maximising the impact of an isolated structure, the collective impact strategy proposes that it is better to create convergence of existing actions, with a holistic approach for a greater impact on the challenge addressed.

Above all, it offers reference points for working together and provides a framework for piloting the action while taking care to define objectives in advance and make regular assessments in order to ensure they are met. This methodological approach applies to all levels of action and ensures there is dialogue between them.

Actors are persuaded that these partnerships are the future of sustainable development, because it involves an organised civil society, which can involve the citizenry.
The Department of Ille-et-Vilaine has been involved since 1984 in the development of the Mopti region in Mali. The department’s support focuses on economic and social development. It initially concentrated on developing the dairy sector and institutional support for creating a geographic information system. Since 2016, it has dealt with renewable energy projects, in relation to the Fondation Energies pour le monde [Energy for the World Foundation]. Notably, it made possible the installation of two hybrid mini-power stations.

The Articulation des Réseaux Territoriaux (ART) initiative [Articulation of Territorial Networks] of the UNDP launched a project to promote localisation of sustainable development goals (SDGs) in the provinces of Maputo and Cabo Delgado in Mozambique, in collaboration with the Andalusian Agency for International Cooperation and Development and in partnership with UNDP’s local representative. The main goal of the project is to assist in the implementation of SDGs at the local level by supporting development of a partnership between the region of Andalusia and its partner regions that are also committed to implementing the 2030 Agenda and its 17 SDGs. This innovative concept will allow the territories to build their development strategy and benefit from a fruitful exchange of experiences in order to facilitate their learning with respect to localisation of SDGs. Once the first phase of the project is completed, it may be replicated in all of Mozambique’s provinces.
Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships.

**Target 17**

**MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIP**

**All partners?**

The construction of multi-dimensional partnerships is the goal of SDG 17; beyond targets 16 and 17, which have that as their purpose, the construction of pluri-actor partnerships is both the cornerstone and the philosophy of the 2030 Agenda.

This target states that no social problem can be resolved by a single actor or organisation, even if it is very efficient and backed by a government, community, association or visionary entrepreneur. It is always a coordinated effort over the long term by diverse organisations driven by a similar vision and language that truly makes the difference.

Forming alliances is confronting aspects that are at the same time operational, political and strategic.

An alliance, first of all, makes it possible to embrace sustainable development issues in all of their layers and complexity. The multi-actor nature of a project or policy in relation to the previously raised issues of coherence constitute a means for ensuring the impact and permanence of the actions undertaken. Involving stakeholders and beneficiaries in defining a project from the very beginning will ensure that it is appropriated by the actors, thanks to a recognition of common needs and objectives, making the project not just a simple blessing, but a real opportunity to achieve a common goal.

It is furthermore a means for the actors to reinforce their own skills by working together; the process of co-construction may turn out to be as interesting as the goal itself. The experience of co-construction with various actors makes it possible to get to know them better and therefore to better understand one’s environment, and consequently, to better address the issue.

The construction of multi-dimensional partnerships, ultimately, favours capitalising on knowledge and know-how; not only does the multi-actor partnership allow for learning from others (in their diversity, about their methods and field of expertise), but it also allows for capitalising on one’s own knowledge in order to share it more fully with others.

The multi-actor partnership – defined as a common vision, composed of a shared methodological approach and common goal – constitutes an operational application of a democratic and inclusive working order. Taking action this way makes it possible to initiate a citizen-based and participatory approach.
The private sector, a more frequent actor in partnerships

This target highlights the importance of the private sector, which since RIO +20, has been an actor in sustainable development. Public-private partnerships are in a position to promote and stimulate innovation and to call upon new technologies that can then be expanded and reproduced to broaden their impact. In Davos, during the special session dedicated to Cooperation for Peace: Tackling the Root Causes of Global Crises United Nations Secretary General António Guterres declared the need for: “A new generation of partnerships, partnerships not only with governments, not only with civil society and academia but equally partnerships with the business community in the context of the perspective of implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change, creating the conditions for an inclusive and sustainable development – the best way to prevent crises and conflicts in today’s world.” According to recent calculations, António Guterres added, full implementation of SDGs could procure annual returns on investment of $30 billion, and new partnerships could result in a “a fantastic increase in the well-being of people”.

Organisations such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development which includes more than 200 corporate members representing combined revenues of $8,500 billion and 19 million employees, and 70 national boards, want to contribute to SDGs, whose funding requires $5,000 to 7,000 billion a year (...). That is why it is forming an alliance with the United Nations Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative.

Construction of a multi-actor partnership framework leads us to imagine an alliance at different stages: creating it around a common purpose, structuring it so that it can function operationally and organising it for the long term so that it remains strong over the years, built around its common point of reference. Working for the Common Good.

After reform of the mechanism for development cooperation in 1999, the ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (MEAE) [Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs] declared that: “Dialogue between States and their society is indispensable in implementing effective policies to combat poverty and inequalities and to construct a State of law” (Léhoux F., 2008, p. 4).

Concerted pluri-actor programmes (PCPA) are conceived and founded on the principles of enhanced interaction between public actors and civil society organisations (CSOs). They are built around themes representing high-stakes and shared issues, mobilising CSOs, but also public authorities in partner countries. They gradually expanded to other actors in both North and South, including local authorities, Organismes de solidarité internationale des migrations (OSIM) [International Migrants’ Alliance], even economic actors, in particular, those from the social and solidarity economy, cultural organisations and even unions. More than 700 actors from civil society have been mobilised directly in PCPAs to date.

With the changing paradigm of the North/South relationship towards a more balanced collaboration between peers around common and shared issues from region to region, PCPAs foreshadowed the SDGs and implemented principles inherent in the 2030 Agenda.

As emphasised by the statement and capitalisation of PCPAs published in November 2020: “the issue is that of an alliance”. It means knowing “with whom one will be stronger in order to bring about change and reach our goals of a better democracy, respect for human rights... Who are the actors that make the region and how will it evolve?”.


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34. United Nations Global Compact.
The cooperation of Nouvelle-Aquitaine and the Plateau Central Region, supported by the DAECT [Delegation for the External Action of Local Government] between 2016 and 2018, relied upon a strong coalition of complementary institutional, non-profit and private actors, striving to strengthen regional economic development while reducing the effects of climate change.

The inter-regional cooperation was thus open to the possibility for economic actors of both regions to be supported and exchange expertise to develop joint initiatives that benefited the climate. Numerous neo-Aquitaine actors also took part in structuring sectors that contributed to mitigation measures, while participating in the development and implementation of local plans according to their respective field of expertise:

- sustainable management of household waste mobilised three competent communities from Nouvelle-Aquitaine with respect to waste management, in particular, Evolis 23, the joint association of sustainable planning, the SYDED 87 joint association and the Communauté de communes du Pays loudunais [Community of Townships of the Loudun region];
- regional deployment of alternative energies, benefited from the involvement of the Nouvelle-Aquitaine start-up, Mixba, on strategies for decentralised production of renewable energies;
- sustainable management of water resources mobilised technical expertise from the International Office for Water.

In 2014, Unilever joined a consortium financed by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), which launched a tender for funding the WASH project, intended to improve the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene sector in specific countries, notably in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The WASH project improves the health and well-being of targeted communities because washing hands as a preventive measure counts among the most cost-effective investments that one can make regarding public health. This programme is thus confirmed by the hygiene benchmark in SDG 6 (target 2).

A joint bid was created with Plan International (NGO specialising in the improvement of living standards for children) and WaterAid, an NGO focused on clean water, sanitation and hygiene. The partners bring their respective skills: Lifebuoy, Unilever’s soap brand, has a good understanding of consumers which, combined with solid marketing skills, makes innovative solutions possible; the NGOs have in-depth knowledge of the realities on the ground and standards, and have broken through to collaborate with governments by using their networks.

https://ideas4development.org/en/ppp-common-goal-partners/
SDG17 - PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS

Target 18

Data Collection

By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

These elements present the issues and perspectives of target 18, and the framework of their implementation, on a global, European, French and regional scale.

We cannot pilot public policies without “data”

“We while trillions are being spent in developed countries, we need a fraction of that in developing countries to make the investments needed in data”, declared the Vice-Secretary General of the United Nations, Amina J. Mohammed, during the opening of the United Nations World Data Forum on 23 October 2020.

Data are essential resources for decision-making and can increase the effectiveness of public policies. Since the advent of the Internet, their volume and circulation has only increased. Today, 90% of data in circulation were created in the last two years, and their volume should increase on average by 40% a year.

Technological progress makes it possible to process in real time, offering a meaningful breakdown of information over a large range of disciplines. The integration of new data in different fields of research can help produce more detailed information, whose results may benefit all. Scientists at the University of Copenhagen have developed AI capable of determining the profiles likely to succumb to COVID-19, making it possible to prioritise certain profiles for vaccination, and predict the demand for ventilators. Information and communications technology is being increasingly used in Africa to support education; a blessing for mobile operators, including those investing in “m-education” (digital plan), whose revenues could be estimated as high as 70 billion dollars in the coming years.

Data policies are a new field for cooperation

If the use of data makes it possible to direct and monitor achieving the SDGs, it also means guarding against the idea of data that would regulate all of the social sphere. Three reasons thus compel us to think soberly about the place occupied by data in our world.

Affecting all of our daily activities, appropriate data protection measures should be put in place in order to prevent any improper use, and in order to weigh individual rights against collective benefits. The risk of disparities is also present: collection of data is easier in the North than in developing countries, especially when the latter combine their economic situation with the political context or sensitive military forces. Strengthening capacities in these countries is possible, by using, for example, the mobile telephone as a medium to collect sensitive data that is difficult to capture in the field. Lastly, negative externalities on the environment related to the capture and processing of data should be considered.

By transforming our relationship with information, the data then give rise to new challenges, both political and societal. It is now up to us to use them as the powerful tools of inclusion that they can be.

The United Nations understood this with a strategy launched in Cape Town in 2017, and encourages Big Data to achieve the 17 SDGs, particularly with the Open Data Hub for Sustainable Development Goals made available to governments to facilitate their access to open data. Likewise, the United Nations Centre for
Humanitarian Data is increasing the impact and use of data in the humanitarian sector.

The (3rd) United Nations World Data Forum was organised in October 2020 by the High-level Group for Partnership, Coordination and Capacity-Building for Statistics for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and is supported by the World Data Forum Programme Committee, under the guidance of the UN Statistical Commission. It launched a new on-line portal presenting the latest statistics on gender equality and most of all the acceleration of data collection on the pandemic. The DAC and OECD also published a complete guide to data cooperation in 2017.

**THE UNITED NATIONS’ OPEN SDG DATA HUB**

The United Nations set up the Open SDG Data Hub in order to fully implement and monitor progress made in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. It promotes the exploration, analysis and use of SDG data sources for decision-making at all levels. Its goal is to enable data providers, managers and users to discover, understand, and communicate patterns and interrelationships in the wealth of SDG data and statistics that are now available.

https://unstats-undesa.opendata.arcgis.com

**LILO: A FRENCH SEARCH ENGINE THAT FUNDS SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS**

Lilo is a French ethical search engine. Its mission is to provide free funding to community-based projects thanks to profits generated by its users’ internet searches. Projects are selected for their social and environmental relevance and users can then choose which ones will benefit from the money generated by their searches. Lilo is committed to protecting its users’ data privacy in order to encourage people to use their services as much as possible. Data is only used to fulfil Lilo’s ethical mission and is never sold.

https://www.lilo.org

**PROGRESSO SOCIAL BRASIL**

This project aims to make up for the lack non-economic data and data on living conditions in these municipalities thanks to a tool launched by Progresso Social Brasil, the Social Progress Initiative for the Amazon. The data collected has made it possible to identify the specific needs of every municipality in the Amazon and take these into account when drawing up policies designed to improve the lives of local people.

It has encouraged public authorities, companies and civil society to invest their resources in social causes and in the municipalities with the greatest needs. Moreover, some external local authorities chose to implement a similar initiative by creating their own indicators adapted to their situation; Rio de Janeiro was able to do this in partnership with Progresso Social Brasil on the Olympic project.


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35. UN - United Nations World Data Forum concludes with more than 10,000 producers, users connecting to advance solutions for trusted data in COVID-19 response.
Numerous sustainable development indicators

As we have seen, the availability of objective and relevant data is essential to know the status of a society or region and to spark a good-quality debate between all of the actors: decision-makers and rulers, economic and social forces, media and citizens. Feeding the debate is essential so that decisions and their impacts can be compared, so that outcomes are monitored, analysed and taken into account in public policies and so that multi-stakeholder, international, national and local partnerships are developed.

The need to possess reliable and relevant indicators to guide the sustainable development process was identified at the UN conference in Rio in 1992. Paragraph 40.4 of Action 21 refers to developing indicators that go beyond solely economic ones (GDP) or even the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 20 years ago, numerous national and local indicators were drawn up to identify reference data, including measuring well-being.

While in most countries it is relatively easy to calculate GDP, the HDI, or sectoral indicators such as energy, biodiversity and employment, evaluating SDGs is more complex. It requires an initial effort to define the targets, rigorous data collection and a solid statistical framework, which are also a prerequisite for achieving the SDGs.

232 indicators to achieve the 2030 goals

To evaluate this success, the United Nations has defined no less than 232 global indicators that countries should use to evaluate the effectiveness of their actions. In mid-2018, France, for its part, proposed a set of 98 indicators that make up the national framework to monitor the country’s progress in achieving the 17 SDGs. Moreover, it has adopted, since 2015, ten wealth indicators that go beyond GDP and have to be taken into account in public policies, along with the ESEC (Economic, Social and Environmental Council) annual report on the status of France.

Access to good-quality data is not the same in each country, and even more so when it relates to implementing open data or the use of new tools such as big data. Cooperation in terms of statistics, which is public good, is therefore necessary to equip developing countries and the least developed countries, in order to improve data quality, harmonise methodology and ultimately to increase exchanges of comparable data. Actors such as INSEE, Expertise France, Eurostat and various national and regional institutions from European Union countries are working in this field alongside these countries.

Target 19 of SDG 17 also encourages local authorities to set out their own sustainable development indicators. It suggests developing local partnerships and resource centres as is the case in France with, for example, the réseau national des centres de ressources de la politique de la Ville (RNCPRV), a resource hub for municipal policy, or the Local Agenda 21.

In the same manner, companies are developing more and more CSR indicators based on extra-financial performances that they must meet, without the indicators being identical between companies, but that allow for (on the condition of being well explained) measuring the company’s corporate, social and environmental impact. These indicators are increasingly based on the 17 SDGs.

The last target of SDG 17 requires progress indicators to be established “by 2030”. Nobody doubts that these will be impacted by the manner in which the world will emerge from the health crisis.
The Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data (GPSDD) is a network of more than 150 stakeholders who represent the full range of data producers and users (governments, companies, NGOs, international and academic institutions, foundations, statistics agencies and data communities). The GPSDD network encourages collaboration among stakeholders to allow for the integration and use of adapted data to monitor the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=9691

In 2015, France passed a law that aims to take into account new wealth indicators when drawing up public policies. This law enables the creation of new indicators for standards of living and sustainable development and is intended to complement GDP. It requires the government to present an annual status report to parliament in October detailing the progress of these indicators and the impact of reforms during the previous year measured on the basis of these new indicators and the evolution of GDP.

https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/20952-statistiques-indicateurs-de-richesse-pib-politiques-publiques-indi

This initiative pools information regarding social and local cohesion so that it can fuel the creation of sustainable development progress indicators. It is formed of a network of 20 resource hubs for municipal policy (RNCRPV), supported by the National Agency for Territorial Cohesion (ANCT), in order to strengthen social and local cohesion between stakeholders, at various local levels, and to facilitate partnerships between the stakeholders and between regions, as stipulated in the partnership charter for resource centres, and signed off by national associations for elected officials (Association of French Regions (ARF), Assembly of French Departments (ADF), ADCF, Association of Mayors of Urban Cities of France (AMGVF-France), AMF, Villes et banlieue (Towns and suburbs), Villes de France (Towns of France)). This network has pooled its resources with the COSOTER platform.

http://cosoter-ressources.info/
While the first part of the paper simply covered the content of SDG 17 in order to analyse it, this second part will move away from this to discuss the spirit of SDG 17.

Firstly, by looking at the history of global partners who assist developing countries and their sustainable development, a sort of SDG 17 genesis (1st part); then by analysing from when and under which conditions it is truly possible to talk about co-construction, co-production of collective intelligence once several associations decided to work together (2nd part); and finally by analysing the geopolitical landscape of the day, which is sorely testing the spirit of SDG 17 and its initiative for multi-stakeholder cooperation and international solidarity, even if it is the only route out of the multiple crises that we are experiencing (3rd part).

In this second part of the paper, we will go further by proposing an intellectual analysis of the scope of SDG 17.
Founded in 1993, the Club of Budapest condemned in its Manifesto attitudes such as “Letting others be what they want as long as they stay in their corner of the world” and “letting them do what they want as long as they don’t do it in my backyard”, and specified that:

As the diverse organs in a body, diverse peoples and cultures need to work together to maintain the whole system in which they are a part, a system that is the human community in its planetary abode” and “In the last decade of the 20th century, different nations and cultures must develop the compassion and the solidarity that could enable all of us to go beyond the stance of passive tolerance, to actively work with and complement each other.

The members of the Club of Budapest invented, without knowing it, SDG 17.

Following on from the MDGs, that allowed for reducing poverty, facilitated access to water and sanitation, reduced child mortality, improved maternal health, created better free primary education by encouraging countries to invest in their future generations, and effectively fought against chronic diseases, the international community extended the Millennium Development Goals to other areas, in light of the need to urgently protect life on our planet.

The last SDG, that of “partnerships”, was adopted at the end of the Addis Ababa conference to respond to the most fragile countries who feared that a higher number of targets, compared to MDGs, would reduce the international effort for poor countries. Essentially, it carries the “voice of the South”, but also a new vision, one that we often call the hope – or utopia – of a positive side to globalisation.
SDG 17 is often described as the SDG of partnerships. In reality, to use words rooted in international vocabulary, it is more of a cooperation and development goal; the term “partnership” is only mentioned in its targets 16 and 17 (out of the 19 allocated to this SDG), with the following definitions: “Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries” (16), and “Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships” (17).

But the text of the Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 provided a very clear insight into the concept of “partnership”, and focused on the fact that:

1. Partnership, from Rio 1992 to the 2030 Agenda

The expression “partnership” has certainly been used since the existence of international cooperation: accordingly, the Rio Declaration evoked in its recitals “a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people”, and in its Principle 7, relating to the environment, reiterated: “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem”. 20 years later, the Johannesburg Declaration reaffirmed in its paragraph 18 that:

We welcome the focus of the Johannesburg Summit on the indivisibility of human dignity and are resolved, through decisions on targets, timetables and partnerships, to speedily increase access to such basic requirements as clean water, sanitation, adequate shelter, energy, health care, food security and the protection of biodiversity.

The Declaration specified the need for a regional aspect to partnerships, in its paragraph 23:

We welcome and support the emergence of stronger regional groupings and alliances, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, to promote regional cooperation, improved international cooperation and sustainable development.

The Paris Agreement does not return to the term “partnerships”, following the example of the 1992 Convention on Climate Change. However, in its Article 6, regarding States that wish to undertake additional efforts to reduce greenhouse gases, it is a question of “voluntary cooperation”, and states:

1. Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.
Next, COP 22 in Marrakesh once again discussed the term “partnership” (Marrakesh Partnership, MPGCA, or Partnership for Global Climate Action), that aims to bring together state and non-state actors on the same platform.

Environmental conferences have created unprecedented national partnerships: one of the most significant changes of the second decade of this century has been the formation of coalitions of countries outside of the usual groupings, who are forming alliances based on coherent and shared positions, geographical or geopolitical strategies, or simple common interests. Hence, COP 21 had no less than 9 coalitions:

- BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China),
- The Arab Group (bringing together countries for whom mitigation actions are a disadvantage for their economies),
- ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America with 11 countries),
- AILAC (Association of independent States of Latin America and the Caribbean, with 6 more moderate countries than the previous ones),
- AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) that counts 39 members (and five observers) united by their vulnerability faced with rising sea levels due to climate change,
- The African Group, bringing together 54 countries from the African continent,
- The Least Developed Countries Group (48 LDCs): bringing together 48 of the least-developed countries (34 in Africa, 13 in Asia and 1 in the Caribbean) who are fighting for specific financing, Coalition of Tropical Forest States (40 countries from major forest basins),
- Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change (LMDC) led by Malaysia, a spontaneous coalition of 24 countries that was set up during a negotiation session of the ADP working group (UNFCCC) in May 2012 in Bonn.

The term “partnership” ultimately tends to replace the term “cooperation”, as per the following two examples.

The new Cotonou Agreement, between the European Union and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), concluded in 2020 gives the word “Partnership” its backbone: as from Article F3, the designation “partnership dialogue” replaces what was previously called, in earlier agreements, “political dialogue”, and sometimes “policy dialogue”. With the aim of demonstrating that the EU and ACP are on an equal footing, the drafting of the agreement has become more symmetrical. (…) As if to create doubt, the designation “genuine partnership” appeared at the beginning of regional protocols, alongside ambitious qualifiers: equality between partners, reciprocity, mutual respect and responsibility, shared ownership.

In the same manner, the draft programming law relating to joint development and the fight against global inequalities, currently being discussed in Parliament, provides under its Article 1 a “global partnership framework” (CPG), which will have an appendix attached, with specific “multi-partner” partnership strategies involving all actors and citizens. The Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly stated this in their presentation speech on the law:

“We aim to enhance the value of the role of French non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to whom we are proposing to recognise the right to act. We aim to encourage decentralised cooperation that allows our districts, departments and regions to share their expertise and experience with local authorities in developing countries. We aim to reinvent volunteering for international solidarity, by implementing this framework, which is emblematic for the youth of the South, who could come to lend a helping hand to our associations here in France.”

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37. Draft programming law N°3699 relating to joint development and the fight against global inequalities, p.13.
Additionally, multiple coalitions arising from Alliances formed at the point of the Paris Agreement were created. In 2014, France joined with Peru to launch the Lima-Paris Action Agenda, which brought together key negotiating actors. Subsequently, France supported the One Planet Summit (OPS), which also generated many multi-stakeholder coalitions. There are now more than 330, after the last OPS in December 2020.

CAN (Climate Action Network) attempted to provide a definition of multi-stakeholder coalitions, putting forward the following characteristics for each type:

- It facilitates cooperation between different types of stakeholders, such as governments, civil society, subnational actors or companies. Its added value is found in its capacity to unite stakeholders who do not usually work together, either because they come from different sectors (such as agriculture, transports, finance, climate, energy production etc.), or because they do not work in the same geographical zone;
- It can shine a light into sectors and problems with a lack of regulation. It can also allow for better understanding of the advantages and pitfalls of international action;
- It can be a collective tool to implement political decisions to help governments meet their climate targets.

A very interesting illustration of the “rules” of partnership can be found in the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds. Firstly, affirming that “Partnership implies close cooperation between public authorities, economic and social partners and bodies representing civil society at national, regional and local levels throughout the whole programme cycle consisting of preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.” The regulation specifies:

1. A preparation period (timely disclosure of and easy access to relevant information; sufficient time for partners to analyse and comment on key preparatory documents and on the draft Partnership Agreement and draft programmes);
2. Available channels through which partners may ask questions, may provide contributions and will be informed of the way in which their proposals have been taken into consideration; and dissemination of the outcome of the consultation;
3. The partnership agreement: the Member States supply a list of participating partners in the preparation of the Partnership Agreement; detail the actions taken to ensure the active participation of the partners; define the role of the partners in the preparation of the Partnership Agreement; and disseminate the results of the consultation with partners;
4. The role of partners in monitoring and evaluation is clearly defined;
5. Training on this regulation specifies that the distribution of the roles is key to successful partnerships, which could fail if the rules are not defined from the outset.

These partnership practices have considerably changed international governance, by breaking the traditional notions of state alliances that no longer meet the interests of States that fluctuate based on the subject matter, and notions of immediate results without always thinking of long-term sustainability. However, these elective affinities also make it hard to adhere to and monitor public commitments, because of an unspoken focus on soft international law.

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38. See Global Climate Action Portal, the Climate Initiatives Platform, 39. Among the most recent ones set up during the OPS on 12 December 2020 are: the coalition for implementing recommendations by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD); the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS); la coalition of private investors Climate Action 100+; the Net-Zero Asset Owners Alliance; the Finance in Common coalition, which brings together public development banks; and the Subnational Climate Fund initiative, which is developing public-private partnership models.
However, it is not sufficient to want coalitions and partnerships and to announce them; they need to be designed and built, and answer the rather dizzying question: “What is a global partnership for 8.5 billion people in 2030?”.

A range of actors often respond that collective intelligence would be the key to co-production, the foundation of partnerships. Firstly, it should be noted that co-production has been studied in the field of educational sciences and, taking the example of Piaget, it is based on rather complex cognitive activity in the person who learns processes relating to experimentation, problem solving and the elaboration of temporary systems, by comparison to what is offered by their environment. Collective intelligence is built up with the same processes as the acquisition of intelligence, and this learning phase is what will enable the “international community” to make the transition into adulthood.

In the same manner, John Dewey clearly demonstrated, in his theory of inquiry that:

“[...] on a biological level, organisms must respond to the conditions that surround them to be able to modify these conditions and the relationships of these organisms to these conditions, in order to re-establish reciprocal adaptation which is required to maintain vital functions. Human organisms encounter the same difficulties.”

The different theories of intelligence distinguish between the development of ideas, their validation, their juxtaposition, their listing, and finally construction.

Several organisations are striving to apply SDG 17, that is to say the construction of an alternative world via these different stages. Our SDG 17 is not a “repairing” norm, but a call to action, to “act together”.

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1. 1. Multi-stakeholder initiatives are the bedrock of 21st century cooperation

As we have seen, a new element since the SDGs were adopted in 2015 is that the notion of partnership extends to all of the parties at the same time, whereas during the first 20 years after Rio and with Agenda 21, each body often had to work in silos to build programmes. This evolution can be seen in a negative light, by noting that globalisation (said to be liberal) includes all actors at the same level, without considering the advantages for each party. However, it should be acknowledged that, precisely in the name of fighting against poverty, the UN urges all global entities to collaborate on the same goal.

Are the partners truly co-producing?

The very exercise of sustainable development is definitely one of co-production, as expressed by the famous expression “stakeholders”. Sustainable development is not carried out or implemented without working with a global and local partnership that strives for a sustainable planet. As much as we have theorised about participation, and even written laws on it, with for example the Aarhus Convention at the European level, the concept of co-production remains vague; moreover, it is not sufficient to participate to co-produce.

The standard definition is provided by Ostrom: “Co-production is the process through which input—used to provide a good or a service—is contributed by individuals who are not in the same organisation.” It is immediately obvious that the originality of this organisational model is a two-fold multiplicity of actors, organisations, and types of organisations, that focus on action and target outcomes, by deploying single-sector action plans. These actors implicitly recognise the complexity of our world, by focusing on pragmatism to co-construct a shared resource that goes beyond general interest, the concept of which was edified by States alone.

Co-production can also play a part in choices of governance; it is better adapted to today’s world than single-organisation governments. Pierre Rosanvallon tells us:

> Public policymakers first found themselves confronted by a phenomenon qualified by political science as the irruption of populations, finding themselves henceforth obliged to connect with a growing number of “stakeholders”. Their decisions then took the form of complex iterative processes that broke away from the former habit of clear choices. In this example, the notion of governance refers to a world of regulation characterised by flexible coordination models, in conjunction with a succession of meetings.

Effectively, co-production flourishes more in the domain of governance than in the domain of democracy. We often talk about sustainable development governance, environmental governance, biodiversity governance, and this generates a succession of local and global approaches to a complex system. Co-production is deliberative and participative, it flourishes under governance and it interacts with opinion. This requirement arose from the realisation that major shifts concerning the entire planet and the implementation of changes must take place alongside civil society.

It is now undeniable that all of the implementation phases of public policies, from the design to the evaluation, must be open to the stakeholders. Finally, it can be said that co-production qualifies the democratic exercise as what we are now obliged to do, that is to say “co-viability”: we have to live together, more than 8 billion of us, while keeping the planet viable.

42. Pierre Rosanvallon, in his book “Democratic Legitimacy”, highlights that it is not simply about participation; when Tocqueville talked about “democratic association”, he demonstrated that citizens need to participate to achieve a true democracy such as in America, etc. Many other intellectuals have theorised about this point – such as John Dewey.
2. 10 years of co-production

The tasks arising from the Johannesburg conference have defined co-production in the field of sustainable development. Thus, paragraph 42 of the final declaration of the Summit acknowledges the efforts deployed and the progress made at local and subnational levels, as well as the significant roles that local and subnational governing bodies, and local authorities can play in sustainable development, notably by forming closer ties with citizens and stakeholders and by supplying them with the required information, based on needs, about the three dimensions of sustainable development.

Paragraph 53 celebrates the role of NGOs by highlighting:

“[...] the valuable, potential and effective contribution of non-government organisations in the promotion of sustainable development, based on their long and varied experience, their know-how and their capacities; notably in terms of analysis, sharing information and knowledge, promoting dialogue and supporting the implementation of sustainable development.

The private sector is finding an increased place through the green economy and technologies, and also as a full partner, according to paragraph 46:

“We acknowledge that sustainable development is based on active participation of both the public and private sectors. We are aware that private sector participation, notably in the context of public-private partnerships, which is a valuable tool, can contribute towards sustainable development.”

However, Rio+20 devoted its online discussions, with an unprecedented global impact, to the level of citizens. The UN also supported this move, as the Secretary General of Rio+20, M. Sha Zukang, said in an exclusive interview with DAES News:

“The Rio+20 Conference concerns every woman, man and child on this planet and also those yet to be born. This is your Conference, even if you are not physically present in Rio. Join the global conversation. Connect with the Conference through social media and our website. Make your opinions known to your official delegations and to your favourite Major Groups. Launch initiatives of your own for sustainable development, no matter how big or small. Pitch in to build the sustainable future we all want.”

After the Paris Agreement, one of the most remarkable successes of these coalitions is the Climate Chance Association. It brings together climate actors that seek to unite, on an equal footing, all non-state actors recognised by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (9 groups of actors: local authorities, companies, NGOs, unions, scientific community, representatives from the world of agriculture, youth, indigenous populations and women) to identify priorities and shared proposals, and to strengthen the dynamic between the actors by connecting them (thematic coalitions, summits, action portal).
3. Coordination between the different levels

Coordination between action groups, which are indispensable building blocks for a large-scale extension of the concept of group governance set out by Elinor Ostrom, is fundamental. Today, the challenge is to demonstrate the coherences and interactions of the national framework with local action, and between local action and successfully achieving the 2030 Agenda.

Co-productions are notably taking place in areas where a high number of “collective engagement” experiments are increasing. Thus, in France, a ministerial mission was carried out in 2019-2020, which identified 7 forces of change to make SDG 17 happen and to locally implement it.

A ministerial roadmap followed, based around 21 measures that inspired a proposed law that aims to remove institutional brakes from alliances via a flexible framework, while ensuring that all of the stakeholders involved comply with legal regulations.

What is referred to as “the localisation of SDGs” is an illustration of SDG 17, when it is developed with decentralised cooperation that Cités Unies France defines as a set of partnerships that connect local authorities with foreign local authorities and/or their associations.

This coordination also needs to be implemented in times of crisis, at which point we should refer to the Sendai Framework, also concluded in 2015 which, in its paragraph 26 stresses the need for everyone to work together during a disaster:

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The 7 forces for change I Le Rameau (2019)

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43. This is the goal of the “SDG 17 in action”, presented in this paper.
44. See on catch up the 6th Meeting of the pioneers of local alliances on 8 July 2020: “SDG 17 in action”: 6th Meeting of the pioneers of local alliances (plateforme-capitalisation.org)
45. Proposed law N° 3849 relating to developing collective engagement and innovative alliances serving general interests in local areas for a sustainable society.
46. See concept note “Sustainable Development Objectives (SDGs): decentralised cooperation standards”.
4.4. “Global” collective intelligence

A certain number of conditions are obviously required so that “global” collective intelligence flourishes, and this is where the major principles underpinning the SDGs and the various SDG 17 targets are found.

Firstly, controlling violence. Of course, SDG 16 is inseparable from SDG 17, but economic violence ruins partnerships. We are often against co-production competition, forgetting moreover the origin of the word competition which is “to strive together” in Latin. This is why targets 10, 11 and 12 are so important, because they seek to maintain access for all, even the poorest, to global commerce.

Secondly, trust, or in any case striving for trust to be built up between all of these stakeholders who are now sustainable development actors. We cannot co-produce with people and institutions that we do not trust. This condition appears to be reflected in two targets: the 2nd, which challenges developed countries to honour their commitments on state aid, and the 16th, aimed at global partnership for sustainable development, that expressly advocates “multi-stakeholder partnerships”.

Thirdly, SDG 17 states that there is no global collective intelligence without access to knowledge and science for everybody. Also, it is logical that targets 6, 7 and 8 relating to cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and North-South and South-South cooperation and knowledge sharing are found in SDG 17, and not in SDG 4 relating to education. In fact, knowledge sharing is a powerful vector to establish equal partnerships. In doing so, partnership ethics could be discussed in order to “negotiate” partnership values within the specific context of a scientific research project or when different local morals come together.

Fourthly, associativity is also indispensable; it is known that in psychoanalysis, the aim is to freely associate thoughts that come to mind, but the concept also opens up to new associations developed by sociologist Roger Sue. According to him, it is no longer the economy that determines the face of society but all of the “ways of living together, of connecting with others, communicating, producing, learning, of associating”. Horizontal links that form associative relationships have a bearing on the hierarchical vertical organisation of our institutional structures, that are 250 years old. La Fonda also takes up these analyses, revealing that the SDG partnership framework shares a source of inspiration with the law of 1901 that defines association as an agreement by which persons pool resources for purposes other than getting rich.

Finally, collective intelligence is well reflected in target 17 of the SDG, which aims to “promote public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships”. Ultimately, it is rare that the three-way partnership of public/private/citizen is expressed so precisely, and we believe that this target should be revisited after the experience of the pandemic where, in any case during the first lockdown that affected nearly all countries, the world resorted to applying a “make-do” approach. Can we not envisage improving the structure of these partnerships in light of the probability of experiencing multiple crises in the 21st century, as Le Comité 21 advocates in its proposal of its report on transformations; or Bertrand Badré who proposes a “High Council for Resilience” at national or global levels?

This is mentioned in works produced by Le Rameau:

SDG 17 is the ability to perceive a collective force in fragility, to jointly invent all solutions that are useful to us. SDG 17 invites us to take care of others, and particularly the most fragile, in order to take care of ourselves. It goes even further on the point of co-constructing shared resources by putting forth the notion of the shared link, that connects us and interconnects us. To do so, we need to expand our field of vision, and move away from the simple “contract-exchange” format to move towards one of “contract-alliance”.

48. “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”.
49. Competere in Latin.
50. See the work of Laurent Vidal, Expériences du partenariat au Sud : Le regard des sciences sociales (Experiences of partnership in the South: The view of social sciences), IRD publication 2014.
51. “Create an independent Authority to monitor global risks”.
Attempts to retreat, and the hope of partners: towards a “compossible” world

Objections can be raised that SDG 17 is one of utopia, as it supports a multilateral world with multiple stakeholders, whereas the current trend is towards fragmentation and national retreat, accentuated by the pandemic. However, we propose the defence that it offers a “compossible” world; we are obviously taking our inspiration for this proposal from the letter by Leibniz to Bourguet:

*If the Universe is viewed as a collection, it cannot be said that there are several. This would true if the Universe was a collection of all possibilities; but it is not, because all possibilities are not compossible.*

Given the current complexity of our world and the explosion of its population, Leibniz’s concept provides a matrix to interpret it, that he uses to illustrate that, on a geopolitical front, alliances are disruptive based on the areas of intervention, and, in the internal life of States, reactions and feelings of multiple categories of populations are often no longer compatible with public decisions. However, if compatibility, like multilateralism, which this complexity initiated, turns out to be increasingly difficult, the threats weighing on the balance of the biosphere open up multiple possibilities, from more worrying ones to more calming ones, yet within increased compossibility due to the interdependence between the different species provoked by climate change.

Because, beyond the hope generated by the recent American election, the signs are that institutional blockages are falling away. Certainly, two trends co-exist in the current world, the temptation to retreat, with Western universalism called into question; and the rise of civil society that, particularly via the internet, is open to an immense global “chat”, and consequently random facts are instantly known throughout the world, unless of course it happens in a country cut off from the internet, and moreover, information spreads via multiple channels. This can confirm, without unnecessarily resorting to marketing vocabulary, that we have moved from a world of multilateralism to a multi-channel one, as modern populations use several communication channels (mass media, internet, SMS, social networks) within a UN framework that has retained its original structure.

Barriers are falling away while new walls are built up, partnerships are being formed between actors who are opponents in different fields; NGOs and companies clash in court, yet collaborate as “stakeholders”, the countries of the South demand “differentiated responsibilities”, yet affirm belonging to one humanity, international finance is based on scientific reports, etc. As we said above, free associations are forming that are cyclical, ephemeral, opportunistic and sometimes contradictory. Movements created by young people for the climate illustrate this trend: spontaneous alliances, sometimes without a legal basis, that take part in both international struggles and local solutions.

In France, the emergence of “local catalysts”, that generate links between public and private organisations, are showing evidence of learning initiatives that are
founded on this compossible principle. Their daily action is a response to latent expectations. C'est la rencontre entre les besoins grandissants, lait is the convergence of increasing needs, the awareness of dwindling resources and the pragmatism of public and private organisations confronted with the reality of their actions that has created this movement, that generally remains unconscious, of co-constructing shared resources.

Even the highest world bodies are evaluating the dual constraint of new risks and the desire of people to be involved. An illustration of this renewal of global governance is the recent UN Security Council meeting on 24 February 2021 (highly incapable of going beyond “standard” conflict issues), where an informal group of experts was formed from the Security Council on climate and security, which is a starting point to focus on the concept of “human security”, bringing together governments and representatives of civil security. This initiative can be interpreted as an example of target 15, which promotes “Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development”, because it signals that States remain sovereign under the operating model of the Security Council, while still striving for a global dimension in the Anthropocene.

In a world that will have to lift itself out of the pandemic, which has increased inequalities rather than healthcare services and is giving rise to a different world, SDG 17 remains a compass (as it is often called), but in a storm. Thus, the pandemic is making humanity face its responsibilities: it was already necessary to refresh our economic model; conditions must now be set out for global restart measures with projects compatible with decarbonisation and the preservation of biodiversity. Doing this requires the agreement of and pressure from society, in totally renewed political structures. As stated in a press release by Pacte du pouvoir de vivre (Ability to Live Pact): “Our democracy now has an unprecedented need to rely on collective expertise and engagement from all elements of society, who bring it to life each day”.

We also dare to say that SDG 17 gives credence to the affirmation that a different world is possible, upon the condition that it is compossible. A great transformation or great reset, there are 8 billion of us, and therefore called to make compossible choices.

52. 81% claim to have “a duty to form alliances”, 92% of mayors acknowledge “a need to form alliances” and 84% of company executives say they “want to form alliances” to respond to increasing fragilities.

53. 58 organisations, associations, unions, foundations and mutual insurance companies are united for the CFDT (French trade union) initiative.

54. Comité 21 - rapport La Grande Transformation face à la crise, 12 propositions pour le Monde d’Après (Report on The Great Reset in the face of crises, 12 proposals for the new world).

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PARTNERS

CIRRMA is a platform that brings together the Regional Multi-Stakeholder Network. These networks illustrate the dynamism of local authorities working internationally. Via their missions to provide information, project support and networking, the Regional Multi-Stakeholder Network aims to promote citizen engagement in international cooperation and solidarity projects. CIRRMA oversees consultation, sharing of good practices and the development of joint projects between the Regional Multi-Stakeholder Network, with the aim of ensuring an inter-regional dialogue that is respectful of local areas, their individual characteristics and histories.

Founded in 1975, Cités Unies France is the network of French local authorities working internationally. We support local authorities for the development and implementation of international action, advocating in favour of this international action and, by extension, local governance. We seek to strengthen the coherence and relevance of actions by local authorities working internationally. Our primary areas of focus are decentralised cooperation, development aid, local public policies, local and district governance, decentralisation, coordinating actors, and partnership.

Le Comité 21, which is both a think tank and a do tank, is a platform that brings together the strength of the largest multi-stakeholder network (450 members) dedicated to both sustainable development and expertise in leading and facilitating co-construction. Thus, Le Comité 21 contributes to transforming society towards a sustainable model based on the 2030 Agenda and the 17 global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as much at the local, national and European levels as internationally. Le Comité 21 leads a network composed of companies, local authorities, and associations as well as teaching and research establishments. 4 domains characterise the network’s expertise: "CSR and society", "Climate and energy", "Towns and authorities", and "Citizenship and democracy".

Convergences is a platform for thinking, mobilisation and advocacy that promotes the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the fight against poverty, exclusion and climate change in developed and developing countries. Composed of more than 200 partnering organisations hailing from all sectors, the association acts to generate thinking and action, to disseminate good practices and to boost the co-construction of innovative partnerships for a strong social impact.

Recognised as an association of public interest, La Fonda has been supporting associations since 1981. We bring together expertise from all fields and offer collective intelligence spaces to support association leaders and their partners when considering their policies. Our key areas of expertise: associations; collective-impact strategy models to build up ties between multiple stakeholders; the social and solidarity economy; the renewal of evaluation approaches by value chains.

The General Directorate of Globalization, Culture, Education and International Development of the ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs has financially supported this work through its Delegation for relations with civil society and partnerships (CIV) and its Delegation for the external action of local authorities (DAECT). These two entities define and participate in implementing, respectively, the support policy for French and foreign civil society actors as well as the support strategy for the external action of local authorities, in particular in terms of decentralized cooperation.

Le Rameau is an innovative partnership laboratory that supports novel co-building initiatives, produces knowledge and tests engineering methods, and that makes its work accessible to all in an open-source format. Since its creation in 2006, multi-stakeholder alliances are part of Le Rameau’s DNA. Partnerships are approached from 5 angles: the engagement and performance of organisations, blending socio-economic models, social innovation, local co-construction and partnership dynamics. The purpose of Le Rameau is to enlighten decision-makers and to provide tools to organisations and local authorities. Le Rameau notably operates the partnership observatory, set up in 2008 with the Caisse des dépôts (French public sector financial institution) to monitor the evolution of general-interest alliance movement in France.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been the principle United Nations development institution since 1965. UNDP works in about 170 countries and territories, helping to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities and exclusion. It helps countries to design policies, develop leadership competences and in terms of partnership, strengthen their institutional capacities to build resilience to achieve sustainable development.

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SDG 17

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